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BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HURD PLACE: PROTECTING
THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO
TESTIFY AFTER HER TESTIMONY HAS
BEEN HYPNOTICALLY
REFRESHED
Antonia F. Giuliana*
INTRODUCFION
Imagine you are a criminal defendant accused of murder, and facing
the possibility of a death sentence. You sit at the defendant's table
anxiously awaiting the jury's verdict. You stare at the witness stand,
now empty, and ponder your fate. You focus on the dark wood and
the angular frame of the witness box. The voices around you begin to
fade. But your eyes never move from the witness stand. Your atten-
tion is completely focused on the witness stand. The witness stand
absorbs you. All of a sudden the witness stand is no longer empty.
You see a man pointing at you. He is saying that you were in the
pharmacy on the night of the robbery, that you took his wallet, that
you pointed the gun at the pharmacist, that you fired the gun....
The judge's gavel hits the hard wood of the bench three times. Star-
tled, you look away from the witness stand and notice that the jury has
returned. The verdict is read. You are found guilty and sentenced to
death.'
On what evidence is your death sentence based? The State's "rock-
solid"2 case that seals your fate consists of "unbelievable 'memories'
retrieved through the super-human 'zoom' vision of mesmerized wit-
nesses"3-otherwise known as hypnotically refreshed testimony.4
* I would like to thank Professor James Kainen for his assistance and insightful
comments throughout all phases of the writing of this Note.
1. This scenario is based on Sims v. State, 444 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1983). affd per
curium, 602 So. 2d 1253 (1992), cert denied, 506 U.S. 1065 (1993). Terry Melvin Sims
was convicted and sentenced to death for allegedly participating in a robbery and
shooting. Sims, 444 So. 2d at 923. A witness testified that he was a customer in the
pharmacy on the night of the crime. Id. He testified that he saw Sims point a gun at
the pharmacist. Id. When he tried to leave the pharmacy, the witness said he was
stopped by Sims who took his wallet and then shot another man who was entering
through the front door. Id. Prior to testifying, this witness had been hypnotized by a
police officer with no formal educational training in hypnosis who used a "highly un-
orthodox, quirky, and suggestive form of hypnosis." Sims, 602 So. 2d at 1258 (Kogan,
J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 1259.
3. Id.
4. The hypnotist in the Sims case used the "Reiser Screen Technique," a form of
hypnosis developed by Martin Reiser, Ed.D., a psychologist employed by the Los
Angeles Police Department. Id. at 1255; People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1377 (Cal.
1982) (en bane). The "Reiser Screen Technique" is premised upon the notion that:
Human memory is like a videotape machine that (1) faithfully records, as if
on film, every perception experienced by the witness, (2) permanently stores
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Now imagine you are a criminal defendant charged with manslaugh-
ter for shooting your husband during a violent domestic dispute.5
Your day in court has come.6 You are scared but anticipate your
chance to take the stand and tell your "story" to a jury of your peers.
You approach the witness stand and raise your right hand as you are
sworn in. You take your seat in the witness box. Your lawyer poses
the first question. You open your mouth, and as your first word is
formed-the first word of the most important story you will ever
tell-the prosecutor objects.
Because you underwent hypnosis to aid your recollection of the
events surrounding the crime with which you are charged, the judge
issued a pre-trial order limiting your testimony to "matters
remembered and stated to the [hypnotist] prior to being placed under
hypnosis."'7 Unfortunately, the hypnotist did not take copious notes
during the pre-hypnotic interview.8 As a consequence, when you fi-
nally confront your accusers and begin to tell them your version of
events relating to the alleged crime, the prosecutor repeatedly inter-
rupts your testimony objecting to every detail not expressly stated in
the hypnotist's notes.9 The result? You are virtually prevented from
describing any events surrounding the shooting even though the testi-
such recorded perceptions in the brain at a subconscious level, and (3) accu-
rately "replays" them in their original form when the witness is placed under
hypnosis and asked to remember them.
Id. at 1377. A hypnotist employing this technique may assure the hypnotized subject
that because her memory functions like a video recorder, she has the ability to move
the action in her mind's eye forward and backward or freeze the action and "zoom in"
on a scene she is attempting to remember. Sims, 602 So. 2d at 1255. At trial, an expert
witness testified that the theory of memory espoused by the Reiser Screen Technique
is "sheer science fiction." Id. at 1258. The expert explained that human eyes are not
"electronic gadgets that can 'zoom' in this manner. And this type of 'zooming' cer-
tainly cannot be done after the fact inside the mind." Id. In fact, as Justice Kogan
points out in his dissent, such a proposition is tantamount to assuring the subject that
she, like the cartoon hero "Superman," possesses "X-ray vision" and can see through
solid walls. Id.
Unfortunately, the Sims case is not an isolated instance of this suspect form of hyp-
nosis being employed in a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Barnes v. Henderson, 725 F.
Supp. 142, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that the police officer-hypnotist told the wit-
ness that he was going to "plant a very powerful suggestion in his mind"); State ex reL
Neely v. Sherrill, 799 P.2d 849, 850 (Ariz. 1990) (stating that the investigator in the
case, who was neither a psychologist nor a psychiatrist, hypnotized the victim of an
armed robbery by using the "T.V. technique" in which the victim was told to "go
back" to the crime scene and recall the events as if viewing them on a television set);
Commonwealth v. Kater, 567 N.E.2d 885, 890 (Mass. 1991) (noting that the hypno-
tized witnesses were told they could visualize the crime and "zoom in" on particular
aspects of the scene).
5. This example is based on Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
6. Id at 51. In Rock, the Court noted that a criminal defendant's right to her day
in court is ingrained in our system of jurisprudence. Id.
7. Id. at 48 n.3.
8. Id at 48 & n.4.
9. Id at 48 n.4.
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mony of other witnesses at trial corroborates many of those events. 10
Without having the chance to present your own version of events" in
your own words,'2 you are convicted of manslaughter 3 and sentenced
to ten years imprisonment.' 4
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony in criminal tri-
als. 5 In Rock v. Arkansas,'6 a sharply divided Court held that States
cannot adopt per se rules that exclude a criminal defendant's hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony because such rules infringe impermissibly on
the accused's constitutional right to testify on her own behalf.' 7 With
respect to witnesses other than the accused, the Court stated, "This
case does not involve the admissibility of testimony of previously hyp-
notized witnesses other than criminal defendants, and we express no
opinion on that issue."" Therefore, as the Court implies and as the
above examples illustrate, there is something clearly unique about the
criminal defendant as a witness. 19 This Note contends that the "story"
the Constitution entites the accused to tell distinguishes her from
other witnesses she presents in her defense who testify, not to tell a
story, but to produce reliable information.
Accordingly, this Note argues that the Court's holding in Rock
should be limited exclusively to criminal defendants, allowing state
and federal governments, free of constitutional constraints, to adopt
per se rules of exclusion applicable to the hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony of all other witnesses. Moreover, this Note urges that, due to
10. Id. at 57.
11. 1& at 52.
12. ld.
13. I& at 48. Fortunately, the landmark Supreme Court decision of Rock vacates
and remands your case so that you will have the opportunity to testify on your own
behalf. Id at 62.
14. Charles D. Gill, Jr., Note, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed Testi-
mony: Rock v. Arkansas, 30 B.C. L. Rev. 573, 575 (1989).
15. Rock, 483 U.S. at 45.
16. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
17. Id at 62.
18. Id. at 58 n.15 (emphasis added).
19. Many courts and commentators, however, do not distinguish the criminal de-
fendant from other defense witnesses. See, e.g., People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003,
1021 (Colo. 1987) (Lohr, J., concurring) (remarking that the court sees no reason why
Rock should not apply to all defense witnesses), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 990 (1988);
Gary M. Shaw, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony in Criminal
Trials, 75 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 63-64 (1991) (arguing that "there is nothing unique about
the defendant as a witness that makes [her hypnotically refreshed] recall more reliable
for the defendant than any other defense witness" (emphasis added)). In response,
this Note agrees with Professor Shaw's statement that there is nothing unique about
the accused that would tend to make her hypnotically refreshed testimony more relia-
ble than other defense witnesses. What is unique, however, about the accused that
distinguishes her from other defense witnesses is her autonomy interest in presenting
testimony "in her own words." But see Gill, supra note 14, at 595 (noting a distinction
between the accused and other defense witnesses).
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the present scientific consensus that hypnotically refreshed testimony
is "inherently unreliable,"2 as a matter of policy, state and federal
governments should exercise their discretion and adopt such rules. Fi-
nally, this Note proposes a doctrinal test that courts should apply
when deciding whether to admit the hypnotically refreshed testimony
of a criminal defendant-a test that appropriately considers both the
policy interests and the unique constitutional considerations at stake
when determining the admissibility of such testimony.
Part I of this Note explores the scientific literature on the effect of
hypnosis on memory. It reveals a present consensus within the scien-
tific community that the use of hypnosis to refresh a witness' recollec-
tion of events is inadvisable because such recollection is inherently
unreliable. Part II reviews the history of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony in criminal trials and notes the current trend in the case law
which tends towards refusing to admit the hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony of witnesses other than the criminal defendant. Part III argues
that hypnotically refreshed testimony should be per se inadmissible
with respect to witnesses other than the accused but admissible on a
case-by-case basis with respect to the criminal defendant. To support
this conclusion, part III examines the distinction between witnesses
and the accused in criminal cases. Witnesses other than the accused
testify to present reliable information. In distinction, this Note rea-
sons that a criminal defendant testifies in her defense not necessarily
to provide reliable information, but more importantly, to tell her
20. The Council on Scientific Affairs has found that hypnotically elicited memo-
ries can be contaminated by confabulations and pseudomemories and appear to be
less accurate and reliable than non-hypnotic recall. See Council on Scientific Affairs,
Council Report, Scientific Status of Refreshing Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis,
253 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 1918 (1985) [hereinafter Council Report]. Moreover, Dr. Mar-
tin T. Orne, a leading researcher in the field of forensic hypnosis, who has testified in
numerous criminal trials as an expert, has concluded that information obtained under
hypnosis is inherently unreliable and therefore, hypnotically refreshed testimony cre-
ates the risk of a "serious miscarriage of justice" if used in criminal prosecutions.
Wayne G. Whitehouse et al., Hypnotic Hypermnesia: Enhanced Memory Accessibility
or Report Bias?, 97 J. Abnormal Psychol. 289, 294 (1988). Orne has advocated this
view as late as 1996. See Campbell Perry et al., Rethinking Per Se Exclusions of Hyp-
notically Elicited Recall as Legal Testimony, 44 Int'l J. Clinical & Experimental Hyp-
nosis 66, 78 (1996) (arguing that "a per se exclusion of hypnotically elicited testimony
still appears to be the most prudent policy"). For a listing of Orne's credentials, see
People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1381 n.45 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (acknowledging that
Martin T. Orne, M.D., Ph.D., is a well known and respected member of the medical
profession who has testified often as a hypnosis expert and who has been recognized
repeatedly in published opinions). Dr. Orne has served as a Professor of Psychiatry at
the University of Pennsylvania and as the President of the International Society of
Hypnosis. Id. The cases in which Dr. Orne has testified include: United States v.
Gatto, 924 F.2d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 1991); People v. Wilson, 626 N.E.2d 1282, 1293-94,
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993), reh'g denied, 631 N.E.2d 717 (Ill. 1994); State v. Mack, 292
N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn. 1980); State v. Dreher, 598 A.2d 216, 221 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1991), cert. denied, 606 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1992); and State v. Hurd, 414 A.2d
291, 296 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980). Dr. Orne's affiliation with the University of
Pennsylvania has continued as late as 1996. Perry, supra, at 66.
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"story," which is an exercise of her autonomy interest. A criminal
defendant's autonomy interest does not render reliability irrelevant,
however, when deciding whether evidentiary rules concerned with ac-
curate fact finding can limit the right to testify; rather, reliability is
only part of an equation in which courts must weigh the probative
value of the proof against exclusion's cost to the defendant's right to
participate in her trial in perhaps the most fundamental way. Thus,
exclusive concern with the reliability of testimony from witnesses
other than the criminal defendant permits per se exclusion of their
hypnotically refreshed testimony, while the autonomy interest
uniquely implicated by the criminal defendant's testimony requires an
individualized finding that her particular hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony is sufficiently untrustworthy to overcome the right to testify.
I. HYPNosIS AND ITs EFFECr ON MEMORY
A discussion of hypnotically refreshed testimony would be incom-
plete without first exploring essential principles of memory and hyp-
nosis as defined by the scientific community. As an initial matter, this
part examines general features of memory and then proceeds to ex-
plore hypnosis. After examining the various uses of hypnosis, this
part discusses the problems inherent in the hypnotic process, and
notes the present scientific consensus that memories elicited by hyp-
nosis are inherently unreliable. Accordingly, this part concludes that
the use of hypnosis as a means of refreshing the recollections of wit-
nesses in legal proceedings is inadvisable.
A. Memory
In Remembrance of Things Past,2 Marcel Proust describes a mo-
ment in his life in which his recollection is triggered. 2 Proust recalls
returning home on a cold winter day when his mother offered him a
cup of tea.23 Although it was not his usual habit to do so, he accepted
the tea, and his mother then sent for "one of those squat, plump, little
cakes called 'petites madeleines'"24 which Proust mechanically
soaked in his tea. 5 Upon tasting the warm mixture of madeleine and
tea; Proust was filled with a sensation he could not identify, when sud-
denly the memory revealed itself, and Proust was transported back
into a time in his childhood when he would visit his aunt who would
serve him petites madeleines and lime-blossom tea; and all at once
21. Marcel Proust, 1 Remembrance of Things Past (1954).
22. Id. at 48-51.
23. Id. at 48.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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"the whole of Combray and its surroundings .... sprang into being,"
from his cup of tea.26
Dormant memories lie within each individual, waiting for the ap-
propriate cue to bring the recollection to the surface of awareness.
This section discusses general principles of memory and explains how
cues allow memories to surface and how, in some instances, cues may
function to distort memory.
1. How Memory Works
"[T]rying to remember the past is sometimes like trying to capture a
darting phantom. " 7
Memory is composed of three phases: encoding, storage, and re-
trieval.' First, an experience is "encoded" or transformed into a
memory.29 An event is encoded if special attention is paid to the
event when it occurs.3° Second, the memory is "stored.' "En-
grams," defined as "the transient or enduring changes in our brains
that result from encoding an experience," are the storage mechanisms
for memory.32 Finally, the memory is retrieved by cues that allow us
to remember.33 During this process, "a retrieval cue combines with an
engram in order to yield a subjective experience that we call a
memory."'
Scientists agree that memories are not literal recordings of reality or
mere replicas of events. 35 In 1932, Sir Frederic C. Bartlett, in a pio-
neer study of memory, found that:
[M]emory is productive rather than reproductive .... Remember-
ing is not the re-excitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless and frag-
26. Id. at 48, 50-51; see also Diane Ackerman, A Natural History of Love 117(1994) (describing Proust as a "voluptuous animist" who "believed that memories hid
like demons or sprites inside objects").
27. Daniel L. Schacter, Searching for Memory 3 (1996).
28. David Spiegel, Hypnosis and Suggestion, in Memory Distortion 129, 131(Daniel L. Schacter ed., 1995). Richard Semon is credited with developing this frame-
work for analyzing memory. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 57. In 1904, Semon pub-
lished a monograph entitled Die Mneme which advanced these stages: "engraphy is
Semon's term for encoding information into memory; engram refers to the enduring
change in the nervous system (the 'memory trace') that conserves the effects of expe-
rience across time; and ecphory is the process of activating or retrieving a memory."
Id.
29. Id. at 42.
30. Id.
31. Spiegel, supra note 28, at 131.
32. Schacter, supra note 27, at 58.
33. Id. at 68. Schacter distinguishes between "associative" retrieval and "ef-
fortful" retrieval. Id. Associative retrieval is "an automatic reminding process" that
"occurs when a cue automatically triggers an experience of remembering." Id. Ef-
fortful or "strategic" retrieval "involves a slow, deliberate search of memory." Id.
34. Id. at 70.
35. Id. at 5. Schacter acknowledges the present scientific consensus that the
human mind does not function like a "video recorder." Id. at 40.
2156 [Vol. 65
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mentary traces. It is an imaginative reconstruction, or construction,
built out of the relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass
of organized past reactions or experience.
36
The California Supreme Court notes that Bartlett's view that mem-
ory is reconstructive is the generally accepted view of the profession. 7
The view that memory is reconstructive rather than reproductive has
significant implications within the legal context. If memory is recon-
structive, it follows that the potential for memory distortion exists.3s
If the memory of a witness is distorted, her testimony is unreliable and
may lead to the threat of a serious miscarriage of justice.39 The New
Jersey Supreme Court has noted that while the "fallibility of human
memory poses a fundamental challenge to our system of justice ... it
is an inescapable fact of life that must be understood and
accommodated."' 4
2. Memory Distortion
"[T]he murky twilight zone where memory and reality grope for each
other, usually coupling nicely but sometimes yielding strange concoc-
tions .... "'I
In the modem work on memory distortion, the basic notion is that
the human mind stores memories, not in isolated compartments, but
in a "world" of other memories that can-and usually do-interfere
with each other.42 In addition, there is evidence that the human mind
is adept in grasping the general character of past events, but inept in
recounting specific instances.43 Furthermore, retrieval cues affect how
36. People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1378 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (quoting Sir Fre-
deric C. Bartlett, Remembering (1932, reprinted 1964)).
37. Id Bartlett's view is followed today by Schacter who believes that memories
are constructed out of fragments of experience and it is important to understand how
the fragments are constructed and reconstructed. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 42;
see also State v. Collins, 464 A.2d 1028, 1030 (Md. 1983) (quoting Dr. Daniel Stem,
who testified as an expert and explained the reconstructive theory of memory and
who, at the time of the trial, was a clinical psychologist, Director of Psychological
Service at North Charles General Hospital and assistant professor of psychology at
Loyola College).
38. Schacter, supra note 27, at 101.
39. Whitehouse, supra note 20, at 294.
40. State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 95 (NJ. 1981).
41. Schacter, supra note 27, at 101 (describing memory distortion).
42. Id at 98-104.
43. Id at 9. Consider the following exercise that is intended to demonstrate how
retrieval cues may distort memory. Allow yourself twenty seconds to memorize the
following sequence of words: candy, sour, sugar, bitter, good, taste, tooth, nice,
honey, soda, chocolate, heart, cake, eat, pie. Idt at 103. Choose the word(s) that ap-
peared on the list from the following sequence of words: taste, point, sweet. Id.
Most people will say that they "vividly recall" seeing "sweet" in the first sequence
even though "sweet" was not in fact in the first sequence of words. Id. Between 80-
90% of subjects fall for the "sweet" trap. Id This example demonstrates that people
remember things generally, not specifically. Individuals encode the first sequence of
words as "sweet" things and that is the reason why they remember seeing "sweet"
2157
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an experience is "remembered."" This has significant implications in
the context of criminal prosecutions because this notion suggests that
memory may be manipulated by employing retrieval cues geared at
obtaining a predetermined result.
In a recent study conducted by Professor Daniel L. Schacter, col-
lege students were shown photographs of people and then heard them
speak in either a pleasant or an irritating tone of voice.45 Later, the
subjects were shown the photos again and were asked to recall the
tone of voice the person in the picture had used.46 The results of the
experiment are fascinating:
When students saw a face with a bit of a smile, they tended to say
that the person had previously spoken in a pleasant tone of voice;
when they saw a face with a slight scowl, they tended to say that the
person had spoken in an unpleasant tone. In fact, there was no rela-
tionship between facial expression and tone of voice. Thus, the
"memories" that people reported contained little information about
the event they were trying to recall (the speaker's tone of voice) but
were greatly influenced by the properties of the retrieval cue that
[was given to] them (the positive or negative facial expression).47
The results of this study have important implications within the con-
text of a criminal prosecution. For example, in the investigative phase
of a crime, the way police pose questions to witnesses affects how they
will respond.
The "Wee Care" nursery school sex abuse scandal provides a dis-
turbing example of this phenomenon.48 In this case, Margaret Kelly
Michaels, a nursery school teacher, was indicted on 163 counts of vari-
ous charges alleging bizarre acts of sexual abuse involving twenty Wee
Care boys and girls.49 She was convicted and sentenced to a forty-
seven year jail term.5 0 The New Jersey Appellate Court reversed the
conviction and remanded the case for retrial due to the trial court's
error of not holding a pretrial hearing to decide whether the testimony
of the children who were allegedly sexually abused should have been
excluded because the improper questioning by State investigators had
appear in the first sequence of words even though it did not. For a thorough discus-
sion of the "sweet" phenomenon, see Henry L. Roediger III & Kathleen B. McDer-
mott, Creating False Memories: Remembering Words Not Presented in Lists, 21 J.
Experimental Psychol.: Learning, Memory, & Cognition 803, 812 (1995) (finding
"dramatic evidence" of false memories when subjects were exposed to lists of words
like the "sweet" list above and concluding that the illusion of remembering events
that never happened can occur quite readily).
44. See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
45. Schacter, supra note 27, at 70.
46. Id.
47. Id at 70-71.
48. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994).
49. Id at 1375.
50. Id at 1374-75; see also Ex-Day Care Teacher Suing over Child Sex Abuse Case,
The Record, June 16, 1996, at B5.
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compromised the reliability of the evidence.5 1 The following excerpt
from the children's pre-trial interviews demonstrates the suggestive
nature of the line of questioning employed by the investigators:
[The following excerpt is from an interview with R.F., a three year
old girl.]
Detective: Do you think Kelly can hurt you?
R.F.: No.
Detective: Did Kelly say she can hurt you? Did Kelly ever tell
you she can turn into a monster?
R.F.: Yes.
Detective: What did she tell you?
R.F.: She was gonna turn into a monster.5 2
After reviewing the transcripts of the children's interviews, the appel-
late court reversed Michaels's conviction finding that it had been
based on testimony that was the product of "coercive and unduly sug-
gestive methods" employed by the investigators."3 In affirming the
Appellate Division's reversal of the conviction, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey noted that there were numerous instances in the record in
which the investigators asked the children leading questions or pro-
vided details of abuse that the children themselves had not
mentioned.
The investigators in the Michaels case manipulated the retrieval
process of memory by utilizing "cues" that caused the children to "re-
member" instances of abuse that were never corroborated by physical
evidence. Intriguingly, during the seven-month period that Michaels
worked at Wee Care, the nursery school never received a complaint
about her from the children, parents, or staff.55 Michaels also passed a
lie detector test.56 Not until ten years later, however, was the legal
ordeal resolved for Michaels-an ordeal that could have been avoided
had the police used non-coercive questioning techniques instead of
manipulating the memories of thirty-four pre-school children wvith
overt suggestions of abuse.'
Likewise, hypnosis is a "coercive method" that law enforcement of-
ficials may use to manipulate the memories of witnesses. The next
section discusses hypnosis and explains how it may be abused wvithin
the context of a criminal prosecution.
51. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1374.
52. Id at 1385-86.
53. Id at 1380.
54. Id
55. Id at 1374.
56. Ia at 1375.
57. Id at 1380. Recently, Michaels filed suit against the prosecutors and other
authorities involved in her case for malicious prosecution. See Ex-Day Care Teacher,
supra note 50, at B5.
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B. Hypnosis
The term "hypnotism" was coined in 1842 by Dr. James Braid,58 and
is derived from the Greek root "hypno" which means "sleep." 9 Hyp-
nos, the Greco-Roman god of sleep, was the son of Nyx (Night) and
the brother of Thanatos (Death).6° Through Hypnos's chamber in the
underworld ran the river of forgetfulness and oblivion.6' According to
myth, Hera enlisted the aid of Hypnos to lull Zeus to sleep so that she
could assist the Greeks in their war against Troy.6z Even by its
designation then, the connotation attached to hypnosis suggests a
somewhat sinister nature. In order to discern hypnosis' "true self,"
this section offers a historical overview of hypnosis, and notes its con-
troversial emergence in both the scientific and legal fields. After dis-
cussing the various uses of hypnosis, this part explores the problems
inherent in the hypnotic process and examines the present scientific
consensus that hypnotically refreshed recollections are inherently
unreliable.
1. Historical Overview
"Several commentators have suggested that the Serpent used hypno-
tism on Eve in the Garden."63
Hypnosis has been around for centuries.64 One source suggests that
hypnosis is as ancient a practice as that of sorcery, magic, and
medicine.65 The use of hypnosis as a scientific tool began in the late
1700s when Franz Mesmer, a Viennese physician, began to use the
technique to treat patients.66 Hypnosis first appeared in the American
58. 5 Oxford English Dictionary 504-05 (1961).
59. Id at 504.
60. 6 New Encyclopaedia Britannica 203 (15th ed. 1994) [hereinafter Encyclopae-
dia Britannica].
61. Id
62. Id
63. Richard H. Underwood, Truth Verifiers: From the Hot Iron to the Lie Detec-
tor, 84 Ky. LJ. 597, 639 (1996).
64. See People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1361 (Cal. 1982) (en banc). The Califor-
nia Supreme Court notes in Shirley that "[w]hile passing through periods of vogue
and of disrepute, hypnosis has been practiced in one form or another for centuries."
Id.
65. Encyclopaedia Britannica, supra note 60. This section was edited by Dr. Mar-
tin T. Ome, an expert in the field of hypnosis. See Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1381 n.45.
66. Encyclopaedia Britannica, supra note 60, at 203. Mesmer was soon discred-
ited, however, because his theory rested on the belief that hypnosis was an occult
force. Id Mesmer's theory of "animal magnetism" was premised on the notion that a
"force flowed through the hypnotist into the subject." Id. Hypnotism continued to
interest medical practitioners, however, and in the late nineteenth century, gained
Sigmund Freud's attention. Id. Freud, an Austrian physician, later deemed the father
of psychoanalysis, used hypnosis to treat patients with neurotic disorders. Id. Due to
various factors, including the difficulty he encountered in hypnotizing certain patients,
Freud later discarded hypnosis. Id. The use of hypnosis as a psychotherapeutic tool,
however, continued in the early twentieth century and included the treatment of
soldiers with combat neuroses during World Wars I and II. Id Later in the twentieth
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court system in 189767 but was quickly discredited until recently when
hypnosis began to be utilized as a method of refreshing a witness rec-
ollection in legal proceedings. 68
2. What Is Hypnosis?
"Virtually everyone has heard of hypnotism; no one knows exactly
what it is-including hypnotism researchers. "6 9
Presently, there is no single, generally accepted theory or definition
of hypnosis.70 One definition explains hypnosis as "a state of aroused,
attentive, focused concentration with a relative constriction of periph-
eral awareness ... and heightened responsiveness to social cues."7
Black's Law Dictionary defines hypnosis as "[a] state of heightened
concentration with diminished awareness of peripheral events...
[that] is generally characterized by extreme responsiveness to sugges-
tions from the hypnotist."'  Modem memory expert Professor Daniel
L. Schacter describes hypnosis as "a social process in which the sug-
gestions and cues provided by the hypnotist guide the hypnotized indi-
vidual through an imaginative, role-playing activity. ' 73 At least one
court has defined hypnosis as a "highly suggestible state into which a
willing subject is induced."'74 Common to these varying definitions of
hypnosis is the feature of suggestibility. This is significant because, as
discussed infra, heightened suggestibility of the hypnotized subject is
the primary problem with using hypnosis in criminal prosecutions.
century, hypnosis began to be used for a variety of medical purposes which this Note
discusses in part I.B.3.
67. See infra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
68. See Andrew C. Callari, Note, Rock v. Arkansas: Hypnotically "Refreshed"
Testimony or Hypnotically "Manufactured" Testimony?, 74 Cornell L Rev. 136, 137-
38 (1988); William G. Traynor, Comment, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influ-
enced Testimony, 55 Tenn. L. Rev. 785, 785 n.2 (1988); Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1361. One
source indicates that the first officially approved course in hypno-investigation was
implemented by the Ridgefield, New Jersey police department in 1962. Whitney S.
Hibbard & Raymond W. Worring, Forensic Hypnosis: The Practical Application of
Hypnosis in Criminal Investigations 23 (rev'd 1st ed. 1996).
69. Shaw, supra note 19, at 1.
70. Council Report, supra note 20, at 1919. For a discussion of the various "scien-
tific medico-legal" theories of hypnotic effects, see Mary Christine Bonnema, "Trance
on Trial". An Exegesis of Hypnotism and Criminal Responsibility, 39 Wayne L Rev.
1299, 1301-09 (1993).
71. Spiegel, supra note 28, at 129.
72. Black's Law Dictionary 742 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
73. Schacter, supra note 27, at 107.
74. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 765 (Minn. 1980) (citing J. Coleman, Abnor-
mal Psychology and Modem Life 579 (2d ed. 1960)).
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How does one become hypnotized?7 5 There are three main fea-
tures of hypnosis: absorption, dissociation, and suggestibility.76 Ab-
sorption involves the narrow focusing of attention." Dissociation
entails the restriction of attention away from the periphery of aware-
ness.71 Suggestibility refers to the fact that the hypnotized subject ac-
cepts instructions from the hypnotist relatively uncritically.79
The three phases of memory8 ° are each affected by the three fea-
tures of hypnosis:81 encoding is affected by absorption,' storage is
affected by dissociation, and retrieval is affected by suggestibility.83
Considering that retrieval cues help to shape the construction of a
75. While testifying in a criminal trial, a hypnotist offered the following comment,
perhaps in an effort to demystify the hypnotic process: "Hypnosis ... takes no great
feat. Essentially anyone can do it, despite what appears to be a very mysterious kind
of process. All that is involved in inducing a person into hypnosis is a very boring
voice and monotonous repetition of words." Harding v. State, 246 A.2d 302, 306 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1968).
76. Spiegel, supra note 28, at 130-31.
77. See id. at 130.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 131.
80. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
82. The phenomenon of "weapon focus" provides an example of how the absorp-
tion process of hypnosis affects encoding. Weapon focus occurs when a victim be-
comes fixated on-or "absorbed" by-the weapon used by the perpetrator in
commission of the crime. Schacter, supra note 27, at 210. Because the weapon cap-
tures the subject's attention, other aspects of the scene are not well encoded into
memory. Id As a result, the victim will have an accurate memory of the weapon but
her memory of other aspects of the event will be less clear. Id. For example, she may
be unable to remember what the perpetrator's face looked like. Id. In such a case, the
police may use hypnosis to refresh the victim's recollection of the perpetrator's physi-
cal characteristics. This is problematic from a scientific standpoint because the cur-
rent belief is that individuals remember only what they have encoded. See id. at 52.
Accordingly, it is illogical to believe that hypnosis may restore a memory that does
not exist because it was not encoded at the time of the experience.
83. Schacter comments that an individual's memory of an experience is to a large
extent constructed or invented at the time of attempted recall. Schacter, supra note
27, at 21-22. Schacter adds that the recollection of an event depends on the individ-
ual's purposes and goals at the time she attempts to remember it. Id. at 22. A study
conducted by Loftus and Palmer illustrates this principle. See Elizabeth F. Loftus &
John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the Inter-
action Between Language and Memory, 13 J. Verbal Learning & Verbal Behav. 585
(1974). In this study, the researchers found that the types of questions used to stimu-
late a subject's memory influences how she remembers what happened. Id. at 586.
The subjects were shown a videotaped car crash. Id. They were then asked how fast
the cars were traveling when they "smashed into each other" or when they "hit each
other." Id. Those subjects that were asked how fast the cars were traveling when they
"smashed into each other" "remembered" the cars as going faster than those subjects
that were asked how fast the cars were going when they "hit each other." Id. at 588.
The researchers suggested that the word "smashed" connoted greater impact than the
word "hit." Id. at 586. The results of this study demonstrate that retrieval cues-in
this case, the verbal suggestions provided by the examiners-may be manipulated to
affect how a subject "remembers" an event.
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memory,s4 the retrieval process of a hypnotized subject is especially
vulnerable to memory distortion due to the heightened suggestibility
that accompanies hypnosis. In the worst case scenario, the subject
may be transformed into an "honest liar"-an individual who believes
strongly in implanted or imagined memories."' Consequently, hyp-
notically refreshed recollection is especially vulnerable to memory dis-
tortion, and its use within criminal prosecutions as a means of
presenting reliable testimony into evidence in order to ascertain the
truth of the matter is questionable at best. 6
3. The Uses of Hypnosis
"Can hypnosis recover repressed memories of sexual abuse, satanic
ritual abuse, past life abuse, and abuse at the hands of aliens?"'
Hypnosis is currently used for certain therapeutic purposes.88 For
example, hypnosis has been used to relieve the pain associated with
cancer,89 severe burns,90 and irritable bowel syndrome. 9' In addition,
hypnosis is used in psychotherapy to treat the aftereffects of trauma92
and to retrieve "repressed" memories of past abuse.93 On the lighter
84. Schacter, supra note 27, at 105, 321 n.14.
85. Spiegel, supra note 28, at 139. The "honest liar" effect of hypnosis occurs
when the hypnotized individual experiences herself as retrieving information from her
memory when she is actually creating the information in an imaginative process. Id. at
140; People v. Sorscher, 391 N.W.2d 365, 367 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (describing the
"honest liar" effect as occuring when a "hypnotized person. . . become[s] so attached
to a certain premise that the person... confabulate[s] facts which never occurred to
sup port the premise and present[s] these 'facts' with the conviction of an honest [per-
son]"). This effect is compounded by the fact that the individual who has been hypno-
tized may have a falsely elevated estimate of the accuracy of her recollection. Spiegel,
supra note 28, at 140. The overall effect of the "honest liar" phenomenon is the
greater likelihood of confident errors. Id.
86. See infra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
87. Jill Neimark, The Harvard Professor & the UFOs, Psychol. Today, Mar.-Apr.
1994, at 48.
88. "Hypnosis has been officially endorsed as a therapeutic method by medical,
psychiatric, dental, and psychological associations throughout the world." Encyclo-
paedia Britannica, supra note 60, at 203.
89. NIH Technology Assessment Panel on Integration of Behavioral and Relaxa-
tion Approaches into the Treatment of Chronic Pain and Insomnia, Integration of
Behavioral and Relaxation Approaches into the Treatment of Chronic Pain and Insom-
nia, 276 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 313 (1996).
90. D.R. Patterson et al., Hypnosis in the Treatment of Patients with Severe Burns,
38 Am. J. Clinical Hypnosis 200 (1996).
91. J.L. Roy, Hypnotherapy and Refractory Irritable Bowel Syndrome, 31 Revue
Francaise de Gastro-Enterologie 863 (1995).
92. See Spiegel, supra note 28, at 129.
93. For a discussion of "repressed memory syndrome," see Douglas R. Richmond,
Bad Science: Repressed qnd Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 44 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 517 (1996); Matthew J. Eisenberg, Note, Recovered Memories of Child-
hood Sexual Abuse: The Admissibility Question, 68 Temp. L Rev. 249 (1995).
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side, hypnosis has been acknowledged as a method to cure
hiccoughs. 4
The therapeutic use of hypnosis does not require historical accu-
racy.95 For example, in one case, a hypno-therapist "regressed" a pa-
tient back to the period before her birth; under this form of hypnosis,
the patient recalled in vivid detail thoughts she had while she was a
fetus in the womb. 6 Such use of hypnosis may be defended because it
is therapeutic. The acceptance of hypnosis as a valid therapeutic tool,
however, does not legitimize the use of hypnosis to refresh a witness'
recollection within the legal setting. Because historical accuracy of
witness testimony is crucial in criminal prosecutions, testimony tainted
by a method that compromises historical accuracy-hypnosis, for ex-
ample-should not be admitted under the guise of reliability.97
Despite the threat that hypnosis may distort memory and jurors
may, nevertheless, rely on hypnosis as a means of obtaining reliable,
historically accurate testimony,98 hypnosis continues to be used for
various purposes in the legal setting. Hypnosis is often used in the
investigative phase of criminal proceedings. 99 For example, law en-
forcement officials may hypnotize a witness to recall facts that may
lead to other hard evidence, 100 such as the numbers on a license
plate. 10 ' Such use of hypnosis is not problematic in itself because it
94. Zani v. State, 758 S.W.2d 233, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc) (Teague,
J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
95. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980).
96. State v. Martin, 684 P.2d 651, 652 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (noting that hypnosis
was used in this statutory rape case because the alleged victim could not remember
the incident giving rise to the charge).
97. The possibility that a jury may be unfairly persuaded by hypnotically refreshed
testimony is bolstered by a recent study that supports the proposition that many peo-
ple believe that hypnosis increases the accuracy of eyewitness memory. Graham F.
Wagstaff et al., The Effect of Hypnotically Elicited Testimony on Jurors' Judgments of
Guilt and Innocence, 132 J. Soc. Psychol. 591, 591 (1992). But see Edith Greene et al.,
Impact of Hypnotic Testimony on the Jury, 13 Law & Human Behav. 61, 74 (1989)
(finding that jurors view hypnotically refreshed testimony with a certain amount of
skepticism).
98. Wagstaff, supra note 97, at 591.
99. See Hibbard, supra note 68, at 193-219.
100. Id.
101. For example, law enforcement officials used hypnosis in the Chowchilla bus
kidnapping case. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Hypnotic Evidence in
U.S. Courts, 43 Int'l J. Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis 212, 213 (1995). In this case,
a busload of school children and their driver were kidnapped and driven 100 miles to
a quarry where they were imprisoned in a van that had been buried underground. Id.
Fortunately, the group was able to escape 16 hours later. Id. Unfortunately, none of
the victims could provide meaningful leads to identify their abductors. Id. The inves-
tigators then decided to hypnotize the bus driver hoping that he would be able to
recall the numbers on the license plate of the vehicle used by the kidnappers. Id. The
police were then able to use the partial license plate number to locate the abductors.
Id at 214. Although this case may appear to indicate a triumph for proponents of the
investigative use of hypnosis, two important details may detract from its force. First,
during the abduction, the bus driver "tried desperately to memorize" the license plate
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leads to corroborating evidence-evidence that stands independent of
the hypnosis.
Such use becomes problematic, however, when a previously hypno-
tized witness intends to testify in a criminal trial. Foremost, the risk
remains that her testimony, if not corroborated, has been irrevocably
contaminated by the suggestive nature of the hypnotic process. Sec-
ond, the potential exists for police to abuse the hypnotic procedure
and "create witnesses"'02 via the "honest liar" effect' 0 3 of hypnosis.
In addition to its therapeutic and forensic uses, hypnosis has a
number of questionable uses that invite scrutiny. For example, hypno-
sis has been used for entertainment purp oses, 10 4 and to recover mem-
ories of alien abductions,0 5 past lives,0 6 and satanic ritual abuse.'07
numbers. l at 213. Therefore, because the bus driver engaged in an "elaborative
encoding" process, he was primed to recall the numbers without hypnosis. Schacter,
supra note 27, at 44 (describing "elaborative encoding" as the process by which an
individual forms meaningful mental associations between information that is already
part of her memory and information that she is trying to incorporate into her memory
so that subsequent retrieval of the "new" information will be facilitated). In addition,
while under hypnosis, the bus driver provided two license plate numbers, one of
which was wrong. Id.
102. "There is evidence that some law enforcement agencies hypnotize appropriate
prospective witnesses not to fill gaps in their memory but merely to bolster their cred-
ibility and make them 'unshakable' on the stand." People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354,
1385 n.56 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (citation omitted); see also State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d
764, 769 n.10 (Minn. 1980) (en banc).
103. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
104. Hypnosis, as a form of entertainment, can have serious consequences. Re-
cently, a television hypnotist was sued by a man he put in a trance on stage. Jon
Ungoed-Thomas, Paul McKenna Sued by Man in a Trance, Daily Mail, Oct. 15, 1996,
at 32. The man claims that "being hypnoti[z]ed triggered acute schizophrenia in him"
and that now he "hears voices from God." Id. In addition, the man insists that he
"regressed to childhood for about two weeks and wanted to play with toys all the time
... doodle and blow bubbles through a straw." Id. During the stage trance, the man
asserts that he was made to believe that he was "Mick Jagger, a boy of five, an inter-
preter for aliens, a ballet dancer and a Blind Date contestant." Id. The hypnotist, a
member of the Federation for Ethical Stage Hypnotists, avers that there is no evi-
dence linking the man's condition to stage hypnotism. Id The case has not yet been
settled. Id.
105. See Neimark, supra note 87, at 79. In this article, Dr. John Mack, Pulitzer
Prize-winning psychiatrist, Harvard professor, and self-proclaimed "co-investigator
and co-creator of the abduction phenomenon," discusses his controversial, best-selling
book Abduction which details the "kidnappings" of thirteen individuals by aliens. Id.
at 47, 76 (describing Dr. Mack as the "high priest" of the abduction phenomenon).
Dr. Mack obtained the abduction stories by hypnotizing and regressing nearly eighty
abductees. Id at 76. One "abductee" interviewed in Dr. Mack's book claimed to have
seen what he initially believed to be a 15-foot kangaroo, but which he later realized
was actually a small spaceship. Robert S. Boynton, Professor Mack, Phone Home,
Esquire, Mar. 1994, at 48. Another subject from Mack's study reported feeling "torn"
between his family on earth and his alien family. Id Because of abduction stories like
those above, Dr. Mack was investigated by his affiliate University. C. Eugene Emery,
Jr., John Mack.- Off the Hook at Harvard, but with Something Akin to a Warning,
Skeptical Inquirer, Nov. 21, 1995, available in 1995 WL 12544290. After a year-long
investigation, the Dean of Harvard Medical School announced in a public press re-
lease that Dr. Mack continues to be in good standing with the University. Id.
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As if the non-therapeutic "uses" of hypnosis were not problematic
enough, the next section demonstrates that problems inherent in the
hypnotic process itself cautions against its use in criminal
prosecutions.
4. Inherent Problems of Hypnosis
Six essential problems are associated with using hypnosis in legal
proceedings: suggestibility, confabulation, pseudomemory, memory
hardening, source amnesia, and loss of critical judgment.' 0 8 Suggesti-
biity is a state of increased receptiveness and responsiveness to sug-
gestions communicated by the hypnotist.10 9 Dr. Bernard Diamond, a
hypnosis expert,"10 has argued that the suggestibility effect of hypnosis
is impossible to prevent because hypnosis is practically by definition, a
For a different explanation of the abduction phenomenon, see Nicholas P. Spanos
et al., Close Encounters: An Examination of UFO Experiences, 102 J. Abnormal
Psychol. 624 (1993). Because the majority of reports of alien sightings in the experi-
ment were sleep related, Spanos concluded that the sightings were probably explica-
ble in terms of "sleep paralysis" noting that "[s]leep paralysis is typically associated
with extreme fear and a feeling of suffocation as well as with auditory and visual
hallucinations and the sense of a presence." Id. at 630. Under these conditions, an
individual may confuse internally produced images and sensations with external real-
ity. Id.
Fueled by such opposing explanations as those enunciated above, the alien abduc-
tion controversy rages on, enveloping a subtle, symbolic significance in that it repre-
sents "a war over the nature of memory and access routes to it, particularly hypnosis."
Neimark, supra note 76, at 48.
106. Studies have been performed that document hypnotized subjects that confi-
dently remember past lives. See, e.g., Nicholas P. Spanos et al., Secondary Identity
Enactments During Hypnotic Past-Life Regression: A Sociocognitive Perspective, 61 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 308 (1991) [hereinafter Spanos, Past-Life Regression]. In
this study, 110 college students were hypnotized and given the suggestion to "regress
beyond the point of their birth." Id. at 310. Thirty-five of the 110 subjects recalled a
past-life while under hypnosis. Id. Spanos concluded that "past-life reports are fanta-
sies that subjects construct on the basis of their often limited and inaccurate historical
information." Id. at 311. For example, a subject who confidently "remembered" hav-
ing lived a past-life as Julius Caesar admitted post-experimentally that he was pres-
ently studying about Caesar in a history course. Id. Furthermore, under hypnosis,
"Caesar" claimed that it was A.D. 50 and that he was emperor of Rome even though
Caesar died in 44 B.C. and was never crowned emperor. Id. Spanos also noted that
subjects learn to develop past-life identities that are consistent with the expectations
of their hypnotist. Id. at 313. This conclusion provides yet another example of the
powerful influence that suggestion has on the hypnotized subject.
107. Despite extensive investigation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has failed
to document even a single case of satanic ritual abuse, even though such abuse is not
infrequently "remembered" under hypnosis. Schacter, supra note 27, at 269.
108. See Little v. Armontrout, 819 F.2d 1425, 1429-30 (8th Cir. 1987); People v.
Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982) (en banc).
109. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, supra note 60, at 203.
110. Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1381 n.45 (describing Dr. Diamond, a Clinical Professor of
Psychiatry and Professor of Law at the University of California, as a "nationally
known specialist in [the] field" of forensic hypnosis).
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state of enhanced suggestibility"' and that the hypnotist's suggestions
control each step of the hypnotic process." 2 Dr. Diamond insists that
the hypnotist, no matter how skilled and attentive, cannot avoid im-
planting suggestions in the subject's mind because such cues are not
always verbal.1 3 In fact, subtle cues 14 such as the hypnotist's de-
meanor and attitude or the context and purpose of the hypnotic ses-
sion may provide the occasion for suggestion as easily as pointed
verbal cues such as the manner in which a question is posed to the
subject." 5 In addition, most hypnotic subjects "aim to please""' 6 the
hypnotist and this may lead them to respond to questions to which
they do not know the answer. 17
Confabulation occurs when the hypnotized subject unconsciously
fills in the gaps in her recollection with fantasized material." 8 This
occurs in order to present the experience the subject is trying to re-
member as a logical whole instead of as a series of disconnected de-
tails and events." 9 Because the subject "aims to please" the
hypnotist, she feels compelled to produce the particular responses she
believes the hypnotist expects of her.' 2 A hypnotized individual is
unwilling to admit that she does not know the answer to a question
posed by the hypnotist.' 2' Instead, she will produce a "memory" that
may consist of: relevant actual facts, irrelevant actual facts, confabula-
tions unconsciously invented to fill gaps in the story, and conscious
lies. 22 The problematic result of this process is that the hypnotized
subject's "memory" will appear perfectly logical to the hypnotist and
others with whom she shares the recollection who may take its truth-
fulness for granted.'"
111. Bernard L. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a
Prospective Witness, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 313, 333 (1980).
112. Id For example, the Spanos study on past-life regression found that "past-life
reports, like hypnotic responding more generally, reflect the goal-directed enactments
of imaginative subjects who employ information from the experimental context... to
create the experiences called for by the suggestions they are administered." Spanos,
Past-Life Regression, supra note 106, at 313.
113. Diamond, supra note 111, at 333.
114. For example, Orne has asserted that the "cues as to what is expected may be
unwittingly communicated before or during the hypnotic procedure, either by the
hypnotist or by someone else, for example, a previous s[ubject], a story, a movie, a
stage show, etc." Id (alteration in original) (citing Owe). In addition, "the nature of
these cues may be quite obscure, both to the hypnotist, to the s[ubject], and even to
the trained observer." Id. (alteration in original).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1382 (Cal. 1982) (en banc).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. IM.
123. Id. at 1382-83.
2167
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Pseudomemories are the false memories that are created by confab-
ulation or in response to suggestion.124 At least one researcher has
argued that pseudomemories are in part the result of social de-
mands.'2 In other words, the creation of pseudomemories is related
in part to the subject's desire to present herself as a "good hypnotic
subject[ ],,126 in the eyes of the hypnotist. In addition to the effect
social demands may exert on the hypnotized subject, there is an exten-
sive range of potentially subtle contextual factors that affect the rate
at which pseudomemories are created. 2 7 Another study has noted
that pseudomemory is a multi-faceted phenomenon' 2s under which
hypnotized subjects report pseudomemories more readily when re-
sponses to questions were implicitly suggested or cued by the
hypnotist. 12
9
The greatest danger the instance of pseudomemory poses in legal
proceedings is the inability of observers to distinguish false recollec-
tion from true memory absent corroboration by independent
means. 3 In addition, because the hypnotized subject feels pressured
to present the hypnotist with a logical and complete memory of the
prior event, neither the detail, coherence, nor plausibility of the result-
mng recollection guarantees the truthfulness or accuracy of the mem-
ory.' 31 Rather, because the human mind, although adept at grasping
124. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court ex rel Maricopa, 644 P.2d 1266, 1281
(Ariz. 1982); Spanos, Past-Life Regression, supra note 106, at 314.
125. Gregory J. Murrey et al., Hypnotically Created Pseudomemories: Further In-
vestigation into the "Memory Distortion or Response Bias" Question, 101 J. Abnormal
Psychol. 75 (1992). This study was designed to test the assertion that "subjects may be
motivated to present themselves as 'good hypnotic subjects' (being attuned to the
social demands of the experiment) but that when it is important to distinguish fantasy
from reality, subjects can do so." Id. at 75. In this experiment, four groups of highly
hypnotizable subjects viewed a video of a robbery simulation. Id. at 76. One week
later, three of the groups heard an audio tape that contained false suggestions con-
cerning details of the crime scene. Id. Those subjects that were exposed to the false
suggestions were more likely to create pseudomemories incorporating the false sug-
gestions into their recollection of the event. Id. Intriguingly, those subjects that were
told they would receive a monetary reward if they were able to remember the scena-
rio accurately created less pseudomemories than those subjects that were not given
the chance to earn a monetary reward for correct recollections. Id. at 77. These re-
sults demonstrate that, despite being hypnotized, subjects retain the ability to distin-
guish fact from fantasy if motivated to do so. Id.
126. Id. at 75.
127. Steven Jay Lynn et al., Hypnosis and Pseudomemories: The Effects of
Prehypnotic Expectancies, 60 J. Personality & Social Psychol. 318 (1991).
128. Peter W. Sheehan et al., Pseudomemory Effects over Time in the Hypnotic Set-
ting, 100 J. Abnormal Psychol. 39 (1991).
129. Id. at 39.
130. See People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1382-83 (Cal. 1982) (en banc); see also
Schacter, supra note 27, at 108 (noting that there is no reliable way to tell the differ-
ence between an accurate memory and an illusory memory).
131. Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1383.
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"the gist" of past experience,132 is inept to recall specific details of an
experience,' 3I such testimony should be regarded with skepticism.
Memory hardening occurs when a witness who does not have confi-
dence in her recollection prior to being hypnotized becomes con-
vinced by the process that the story she told under hypnosis is both
truthful and accurate.'3 In this sense, memory hardening provides
the subject with "false confidence" in her recollections. Within the
context of a criminal prosecution, the fear of perjury as a factor ensur-
ing reliable testimony may be eliminated due to the witness' convic-
tion that her hypnotically refreshed memories are true and
accurate.'
35
Post-hypnotic source amnesia occurs when the hypnotized subject
returns to the waking state and she remembers the content of her
memory but forgets its source. 36 In other words, the subject forgets
that she acquired the memory during the hypnotic session. Source
amnesia compounds the problem of memory hardening because not
only may the subject forget the "dubious source" of her memory, but
she may place unwarranted and uncritical confidence in such memory.
The final problem associated with hypnosis is the loss of critical
judgment. 37 This occurs because hypnosis causes the subject to give
credence to memories so vague and fragmentary that she would not
have relied on them prior to being hypnotized. 38
Because of the problems associated with hypnosis, the present sci-
entific consensus is that memories elicited by hypnosis are "inherently
unreliable."' 39 The Council on Scientific Affairs adheres to this posi-
tion and has found that hypnotically aided recollections can consist of
confabulations and pseudomemories. 40 Moreover, the Council has
found that hypnotically refreshed recollections not only fail to be
more accurate, but actually appear to be less reliable than non-hyp-
132. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
134. Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1383.
135. State v. Coe, 750 P.2d 208, 218 (Wash. 1988) (Dore, J., dissenting) (citing State
v. Martin, 684 P.2d 651 (1984)).
136. Schacter, supra note 27, at 119. Schacter provides the following example of
how source amnesia may affect memory in an every day experience:
[Suppose] you are waiting in a checkout line in the supermarket and notice a
tabloid containing an ugly story that impeaches the honesty or fidelity of a
public figure, you may be inclined to dismiss it because you maintain little
faith in the reliability of the source. But what if several months later you are
engaged in a conversation about the honesty of public figures, and you re-
member the negative story but no longer recall the exact source? You may
be inclined to stake more belief in the story than is warranted because you
fail to remember that your information was acquired from a dubious source.
Id. at 116.
137. See Diamond, supra note 111, at 337-38.
138. Id.
139. Council Report, supra note 20, at 1918.
140. Id. at 1921.
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notic recall. 4' Furthermore, in a recent meta-analysis of twenty-four
research studies that involved the differences in recall accuracy of
hypnotized versus non-hypnotized eyewitnesses,142 the researchers
concluded that hypnosis is not necessarily a source of accurate infor-
mation and that, at worst, it may be a source of inaccurate information
provided with confident testimony.143 The article concluded by urging
caution in the use of hypnotically refreshed testimony.'" Moreover,
prominent hypnosis researchers Dr. Diamond and Dr. Orne, 145 advo-
cate the same cautioned approach to hypnotically refreshed testimony
in criminal trials. Diamond has stated, "I believe that once a potential
witness has been hypnotized for the purpose of enhancing memory
[her] recollections have been so contaminated that [s]he is rendered
effectively incompetent to testify.' 46 Likewise, Orne warns that
"there is a considerable risk that the inherent unreliability of informa-
tion confidently provided by a hypnotized witness may actually be
detrimental to the truth-seeking process.' 47 Furthermore, memory
expert Schacter notes that "controlled studies suggest that hypnosis
does nothing to enhance the accuracy of memory retrieval. Instead,
hypnosis creates a retrieval environment that increases a person's will-
ingness to call just about any mental experience a 'memory.' ",148
The present scientific consensus creates a very strong presumption
against admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony. Because the
problems associated with hypnosis inevitably transform witnesses into
"honest liars," such "inherently unreliable" hypnotically refreshed tes-
timony should never be allowed for the purpose of presenting reliable
information into evidence in criminal trials.
141. ld.
142. See Nancy Mehrkens Steblay & Robert K. Bothwell, Evidence for Hypnoti-
cally Refreshed Testimony: The View from the Laboratory, 18 Law & Human Behav.
635 (1994).
143. Id. at 648.
144. Id- at 648-49.
145. People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1381 n.45 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (describing
Orne and Diamond as "the most persuasive spokesmen for the relevant scientific
community").
146. Diamond, supra note 111, at 314.
147. Whitehouse, supra note 20, at 294. Orne has recently advocated this view. See
Perry, supra note 20, at 78 (stating that "a per se exclusion of hypnotically elicited
testimony still appears to be the most prudent policy").
148. Schacter, supra note 27, at 107-08.
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II. HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY IN CRIMINAL TRIALS:
ROCK V. ARKANSAS AND ITS PROGENY
"What happens when the black letter of the law confronts the black
art of hypnosis?"'49
The current year, 1997, marks the centennial anniversary of the
emergence of hypnosis in the American court system. In 1897, the
Supreme Court of California in People v. Ebanks °50 reviewed a trial
court case in which Joseph Japhet Ebanks was convicted of first de-
gree murder and sentenced to death.' 5 ' Ebanks's conviction was
149. Lisa K. Rozzano, Comment, The Use of Hypnosis in Criminal Trials: The
Black Letter of the Black Art, 21 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 635, 705-06 (1988) (advocating the
cautioned use of hypnosis in criminal trials). There is a vast body of literature that
responds this question. See, e.g., Ira Mickenberg, Mesmerizing Justice: The Use of
Hypnotically-Induced Testimony in Criminal Trials, 34 Syracuse L Rev. 927, 931
(1983) (contending that a per se exclusion of hypnotically refreshed testimony is the
wisest approach); Shaw, supra note 19, at 1 (arguing that hypnotically "enhanced"
testimony should be per se inadmissible as a matter of policy); Callari, supra note 68,
at 136-37 (arguing that per se exclusions of hypnotically "manufactured" testimony
are constitutional and therefore, Rock v. Arkansas was wrongly decided); Paul J.
Chevlin, Comment, State v. Brown: The Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed Tes-
timony in a Criminal Trial, 18 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 231, 244 (1994) (speculating that in
light of Rock v. Arkansas, courts will not reject hypnotically refreshed testimony be-
cause such testimony is just as reliable as other eyewitness testimony); Beth A. Clem-
ens, Comment, Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony: Has It Lost Its Charm?, 15 S. I1.
U. LJ. 289, 320 (1991) (suggesting that courts determine the admissibility of hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony on a case-by-case basis); Amy M. Davis, Note, Does Hypno-
sis Belong in the Legal Process?, 12 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 125, 126 (1988) (encouraging
the use of hypnosis in the legal process); Gill, supra note 14, at 57 (arguing that Rock
v. Arkansas was wrongly decided and poses "a serious threat" to the integrity of the
trial process by forbidding per se exclusions of testimony a criminal defendant
presents on her own behalf); Justin Harsel, Note, R. v. Haywood, 20 Melb. U. L Rev.
897, 907 (1996) (arguing that courts must impose standards for admissibility commen-
surate with the dangers, limitations, and benefits of hypnotically refreshed testimony);
Mark Leen, Note, Hypnosis and the Defendant's Right to Testify in a Criminal Case,
1989 Utah L. Rev. 545, 565 n.112, 570 (asserting that the reliability problem of hyp-
notically refreshed testimony may be solved if courts use Federal Rule of Evidence
602 to determine if a previously hypnotized defendant has "personal knowledge" of
matters to which she will testify); Karyn Diane McBride, Comment, The Continuing
Problems with the Use of Hypnosis in Light of Rock v. Arkansas, 9 Hamline J. Pub. L
& PoL 319, 340-41 (1989) (urging courts to restrict the use of hypnotically "induced"
testimony by applying extensive safeguards to such testimony); Kimbro Stephens,
Note, Rock v. Arkansas: Hypnosis and the Criminal Defendant's Right to Testify, 41
Ark. L. Rev. 425, 481 (1988) (urging courts to employ a safeguards approach to hyp-
notically refreshed testimony); Traynor, supra note 68, at 788 (arguing that Rock v.
Arkansas should be read narrowly because hypnotically refreshed testimony is
unreliable).
150. 49 P. 1049 (Cal. 1897).
151. Il Ebanks's "story" is told as follows: In the summer of 1895, Ebanks, a
loner, set out on a quest to a religious sect. Id at 1051. At the same time, Harriet
Stiles, her husband, Leroy Stiles, and her father, J.B. Borden, went camping at the
beach. Id. at 1050. Leroy went fishing one day without his wife and her father. Id.
1050-51. When he returned to the tent, Leroy found the bullet-ridden bodies of Har-
riet and J.B. Id. at 1051. Ebanks's flour sack-in which he kept all of his worldly
possessions-was found near the scene of the murders. IL at 1052. The police found
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based on circumstantial evidence. 52 In his defense, Ebanks called as
a witness a hypnotist who had previously hypnotized him.' 3 The hyp-
notist's testimony was to include his opinion that defendant was not
guilty because he had denied his guilt while under hypnosis.5 4 The
trial court disallowed the testimony because it would be an "illegal
defense"'155 considering that the "law of the United States does not
recognize hypnotism."'1 56 The California Supreme Court agreed with
the lower court on this point and upheld the conviction and death
sentence.'
57
In subsequent years, hypnosis re-emerged within the context of var-
ious legal issues. 58 The current controversy surrounding hypnosis in
the legal context centers on the admission of hypnotically refreshed
testimony. 59 Most courts distinguish among three types of testimony
that result once a witness has been hypnotized: pre-hypnotic, hyp-
notic, and post-hypnotic testimony. 60 Pre-hypnotic testimony refers
to what the witness remembered prior to the hypnotic session. 16  Pre-
hypnotic testimony is usually admissible if it relates to matters recal-
led prior to the hypnosis and if an independent basis is given for the
recollection. 62 Hypnotic testimony is testimony offered while under
hypnosis. 63 Generally, this type of testimony is per se inadmissi-
ble. 64 Post-hypnotic testimony, the subject of much controversy and
a revolver-the alleged murder weapon-in the sack. Id. When the police located
Ebanks and questioned him about his location during the relevant time frame, he
replied that he had little recollection of his whereabouts or actions during that time
because he was excessively drunk. Id. at 1051. The jury subsequently found Ebanks
guilty of the murders. Id. at 1049.
152. Id at 1051-52.
153. Id. at 1053.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. L
157. Id. at 1054.
158. See, e.g., State v. Donovan, 102 N.W. 791, 791-93 (Iowa 1905) (affirming the
conviction of defendant, a married man, for seduction for using flattery, love-making,
and hypnosis to obtain control over a twenty-two year old school teacher); State v.
Exum, 50 S.E. 283 (N.C. 1905) (finding that the accused's use of hypnosis on his wife
to influence her served to discredit her testimony against him in his murder trial);
People v. Bishop, 194 N.E. 238 (1ll. 1934) (holding that defendant's claim that he
involuntarily signed an arson confession and confessed while under hypnosis affects
the weight of the confession rather than its admissibility); United States v. Narciso,
446 F. Supp. 252,252,263 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (addressing a discovery dispute involving
the hypnotic induction profiles of various patients at Ann Arbor Veterans Adminis-
tration Hospital where, after 51 patient deaths in two months, two nurses were
charged with murder for unlawfully poisoning the food of patients).
159. See, e.g., Traynor, supra note 68, at 785 n.2.
160. State v. Johnston, 529 N.E.2d 898, 902-03 (Ohio 1988).
161. Id. at 903.
162. Ii.
163. IM.
164. Id.; Creamer v. State, 205 S.E.2d 240, 241 (Ga. 1974) (recognizing that state-
ments made by a witness while in a hypnotic trance are inadmissible).
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the focus of this Note, is testimony that has been refreshed by
hypnosis.16
5
Currently, there are at least four approaches to the admissibility of
hypnotically refreshed testimony in criminal trials-that such testi-
mony is per se admissible, 66 per se inadmissible, 67 admissible if cer-
tain safeguards are present,' 68 or admissible based upon the totality-
of-the-circumstances. 169
This part presents the approaches to the admissibility of hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony chronologically. First, this part discusses the
cases ruling on the admissibility question prior to the 1987 landmark
Supreme Court decision of Rock v. Arkansas."10 After analyzing the
Rock opinion, this part examines Rock's influence on subsequent
cases, noting a trend towards the inadmissibility of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony.
A. Pre-Rock Approaches to Admissibility (1968-1987)
This section examines pre-Rock approaches to the admissibility of
hypnotically refreshed testimony in criminal trials. The following ap-
proaches are discussed respectively: that hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony is per se admissible, per se inadmissible, admissible if certain
safeguards are satisfied, and admissible on a case-by-case basis or
based upon the totality-of-the-circumstances.
1. Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony Is Per Se Admissible
The view that hypnotically refreshed testimony is per se admissi-
ble17' is based on the premise that hypnosis raises questions of credi-
165. Johnston, 599 N.E.2d at 904.
166. See infra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 189-98 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.
170. This Note does not offer an extensive analysis of pre-Rock cases dealing with
the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony. For a thorough account of the
pre-Rock case law concerning hypnotically refreshed testimony, see Rozzano, supra
note 149, at 636-76.
171. See, e.g., Beck v. Norris, 801 F.2d 242,243-45 (6th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that
the State of Tennessee allows the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony, and
therefore, affirming the district court's denial of the defendant's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus because such testimony was not prejudicial to the defendant); United
States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979) (in-
volving the hypnotically refreshed testimony of a witness to a prison murder); United
States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198-99 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding the admission of
testimony made by a previously hypnotized postal worker who witnessed a robbery of
the Lennox Post Office by a fellow disgruntled postal worker); Clark v. State, 379 So.
2d 372, 375-76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the police officer-hypnotist's
testimony regarding the procedure used to refresh an eyewitness's recollection of the
crime was admissible); Creamer v. State, 205 S.E.2d 240, 241 (Ga. 1974) (upholding
the admission of statements made by a previously hypnotized witness of the State in a
double murder case despite defendant's objections that the "witness was tainted by
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bility, but not admissibility.'72 The rationale for such an approach is
that the testimony of a witness whose memory has been refreshed by
hypnosis should be treated like any other present recollection re-
freshed.1 73 Such an approach recognizes that issues of credibility are
the province of the jury and relies on the jury to serve as "the lie
detector" in the courtroom. 174 As an added safeguard, skillful cross-
examination will enable the jury to evaluate the effect of hypnosis on
the witness and the credibility of the testimony.175
The landmark case in this area is Harding v. State. 76 Harding was
the first case to rule on the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed tes-
timony,177 holding that such testimony is per se admissible. 78 Har-
ding was subsequently overruled in the Maryland courts by State v.
Collins179 in favor of a per se inadmissible approach to hypnotically
refreshed testimony.8 0
virtue of hypnotic trances and seances" conducted by an applied psychologist); State
v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756, 758-60 (La. 1983) (refusing to "assess squarely" the admissi-
bility issue in a case where the witness's prehypnotic recollection matched his post-
hypnotic statements, but holding that the effect of hypnosis on a previously hypno-
tized witness is a factual issue going to the weight of the testimony rather than to its
admissibility). For a more extensive listing of cases, see Thomas M. Fleming, Annota-
tion, Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed or Enhanced Testimony, 77 A.L.R.4th
927 (1990); State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 91 (N.J. 1981).
172. Harding v. State, 246 A.2d 302, 306 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 949 (1969), overruled by State v. Collins, 464 A.2d 1028 (Md. 1983)
173. Hurd, 432 A.2d at 91; Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372, 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979). Under the "present recollection refreshed" doctrine, a device such as a written
statement may be used in an attempt to revive a witness' recollection of an event that
she claims not to remember. Fed. R. Evid. 803(5); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 523
F.2d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1975) (citation omitted).
174. See Awkard, 597 F.2d at 671 (citation omitted).
175. Id. at 670-71.
176. 246 A.2d 302 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968). James Milton Harding was convicted
in a jury trial for assault with intent to rape and assault with intent to murder and
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. Id. at 302-03. Harding had
met M.C., the prosecuting witness, in a bar and they later left with another couple to
go for a drive. Id. at 304. During the drive, Harding became angry with M.C. because
she refused to have sexual relations with him. Id. When Harding told M.C. that she
would have sex with him before she left the car, M.C. responded that she would kill
him first. Id The next morning, M.C. was found in a state of shock lying on the side
of the road; she had been shot. Id. Because M.C. could not remember what had
happened, she was hypnotized a month after the attack at the request of the police.
Id. at 305. Under hypnosis, M.C. recalled the attack and identified Harding as her
assailant. Id. In determining that the trial court properly admitted M.C.'s hypnoti-
cally aided testimony, the Maryland Special Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he fact
that she . . . achieved her present knowledge after being hypnotized concerns the
question of the weight of the evidence which the trier of facts ... must decide." Id. at
306.
177. See Traynor, supra note 68, at 785 n.2.
178. Harding, 246 A.2d at 312.
179. 464 A.2d 1028, 1044-45 (Md. 1982).
180. State v. Collins is addressed in the next section which examines the per se
inadmissibility approach to hypnotically refreshed testimony.
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2. Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony Is Per Se Inadmissible
The view that hypnotically refreshed testimony is per se inadmissi-
ble' 8 ' is usually based on some version of the Frye rule'82 developed
in Frye v. United States13 which requires that novel scientific evidence
must be "generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific com-
munity"'1 to be admissible. Under this approach, because the scien-
tific community does not endorse hypnosis as a means of rendering
historically accurate recollection,18s hypnotically refreshed testimony
is usually found to be unreliable, and therefore inadmissible. 186 The
leading cases in this area are State v. Mack's, and People v. Shirley,' s
both of which involved extensive analyses demonstrating that hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony is an unreliable form of evidence.
181. See, e.g., State er reL Collins v. Superior Court ex rel. Maricopa, 644 P.2d 1266,
1294, 1296 (Ariz. 1982) (holding that hypnotically refreshed testimony is per se inad-
missible because "the law has long recognized that there are few dangers so great in
the search for truth as man's propensity to tamper with the memory of others," and
such evil must be prevented); State v. Mena, 624 P.2d 1274, 1276, 1280 (Ariz. 1981)
(reversing defendant's conviction of aggravated assault and remanding for a new trial
because the hypnotically "adduced" testimony of the victim was erroneously admit-
ted); People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1384 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (holding that the
testimony of a witness who has been hypnotized for the purpose of restoring her
memory of events in issue is per se inadmissible); State v. Moreno, 709 P.2d 103, 105
(Haw. 1985) (adopting a rule that requires a witness to show that her testimony re-
lates to matters recalled prior to being hypnotized); State v. Collins, 464 A2d 1028,
1044-45 (Md. 1983) (holding that hypnotically "enhanced" testimony is per se inad-
missible); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 1980) (holding that the testi-
mony of a previously hypnotized witness may not be admitted in a criminal
prosecution); People v. Hughes, 453 N.E.2d 484, 496 (N.Y. 1983), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 908 (1989) (limiting a previously hypnotized witness' testimony to matters
remembered prior to the hypnotic session); State v. Martin, 684 P.2d 651, 657 (Wash.
1984) (justifying a per se exclusion of hypnotically refreshed testimony due to the
failure of hypnosis to satisfy the Frye rule of novel scientific evidence which requires
such evidence to be deemed reliable by the scientific community). For a more exten-
sive listing of cases, see Fleming, supra note 171, at 927.
182. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923). Under the Frye rule, "the
results of mechanical or scientific testing are not admissible unless the testing has
developed or improved to the point where experts in the field widely share the view
that the results are scientifically reliable as accurate." State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764,
768 (Mlnn. 1980). Frye has recently been overruled in federal courts by the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993), on the basis that the Federal Rules of Evidence supersede Frye. Id. at 585.
Several states continue to adhere to Frye-like rules in determining the admissibility of
novel scientific evidence, however. Accordingly, recognition of the Frye rule remains
relevant to a discussion of the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony.
183. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923).
184. People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1362 (Cal. 1982) (en banc). The Frye rule is
intended to "prevent the jury from being misled by unproven and unsound scientific
methods." Alsbach v. Bader, 700 S.W.2d 823, 829 (Mo. 1985).
185. See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text for the present scientific
consensus.
186. See supra note 181 listing cases that employ a per se inadmissibility approach
to hypnotically refreshed testimony.
187. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
188. 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982) (en banc).
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3. Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony Is Admissible if Certain
Safeguards Are Implemented
Some courts admit testimony that has been refreshed by hypnosis if
certain safeguards are implemented surrounding the hypnotic ses-
sion.189 The rationale for this approach is that hypnotically refreshed
testimony can be made sufficiently reliable to be introduced into evi-
dence.' 9° The landmark decision in this area is State v. Hurd'91 which
implemented the following safeguards developed by Dr. Martin T.
Orne, a leading expert in the field of forensic hypnosis:'9
(1) The hypnotic session should be conducted by a licensed psychi-
atrist or psychologist trained in the use of hypnosis.
(2) The qualified professional conducting the hypnotic session
should be independent of and not responsible to the prosecutor, in-
vestigator or the defense.
(3) Any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement per-
sonnel prior to the hypnotic session must be in written form so that
subsequently the extent of the information the subject received
from the hypnotist may be determined.
(4) Before induction of hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain from
the subject a detailed description of the facts as the subject remem-
bers them, carefully avoiding adding any new elements to the wit-
ness' description of the events.
(5) All contacts between the hypnotist and the subject should be
recorded so that a permanent record is available for comparison
and study to establish that the witness has not received information
or suggestion which might later be reported as having been first de-
scribed by the subject during hypnosis. Videotape should be em-
ployed if possible, but should not be mandatory.
(6) Only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during any
phase of the hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing and
the post-hypnotic interview.' 93
The above safeguards serve a dual purpose: to ensure a minimum
level of reliability' 94 and to reduce the effects of confabulation1 95 or
189. See, e.g., House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815, 817, 826-27 (Miss. 1984) (adopting
eight safeguards to be applied to a witness' hypnotically refreshed recollection to pre-
vent hypnosis from "contaminating" her testimony); State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 89-90(N.J. 1981) (adopting six safeguards developed by hypnosis expert Martin Orne to be
applied to hypnotically refreshed testimony); State v. Weston, 475 N.E.2d 805, 814-15(Ohio 1984) (adopting the Hurd guidelines); Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 91-94 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (adopting eight safeguards and a cautionary jury instruction to
warn the jury of the pitfalls of hypnosis). For a more extensive listing of cases adher-
ing to this approach, see Fleming, supra note 171, at 927.
190. Hurd, 432 A.2d at 92.
191. 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981).
192. See supra note 20 for a listing of Dr. Orne's credentials.
193. Hurd, 432 A.2d at 89-90. Orne has ultimately disavowed his support for these
guidelines. See infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
194. Id at 89.
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suggestion 196 that would otherwise contaminate testimony."9  A safe-
guards approach to hypnotically refreshed testimony is premised on
the assertion that a per se rule of inadmissibility is too broad as it may
exclude evidence that is as trustworthy as other eyewitness
testimony.198
4. Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony Is Admissible Based upon
the Totality-of-the-Circumstances
This approach is used primarily in federal courts and in a minority
of state courts. Under a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to the
admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony, 19 safeguard compli-
ance is only one part of a balanced inquiry 00 In McQueen v. Garri-
son, 2 0 1 the Fourth Circuit noted that "these appeals must be
determined by a detailed factual analysis on a case-by-case basis. ' 21
Other factors considered by courts include the presence of suggestive
statements,20 3 the nature of the memory loss, corroboration of the
testimony by independent evidence, 20 5 and any other factors the court
deems relevant to the case before it.20 6 The rationale defending a
case-by-case analysis of hypnotically refreshed testimony is that a per
se rule of inadmissibility may exclude otherwise reliable evidence. 2°
195. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
197. Hurd, 432 A.2d at 89-90.
198. Id. at 94.
199. See, e.g., McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 944 (holding that the determination of whether hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony was properly admitted in an individual case requires a detailed factual analysis
on a case-by-case basis); United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1201 (5th Cir. 1984)
(examining whether the probative value of the witness' hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony was outweighed by "the dangers of unfair prejudice, jury confusion, or jury
misapprehension"); State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571, 578 (Idaho 1984) (directing trial
judges to conduct pretrial hearings on the procedures used during the hypnotic ses-
sion in question and then to apply a "totality of the circumstances" test to determine
whether the witness' testimony is reliable enough to be admitted); see also Fleming,
supra note 171, at 956-58 for a more extensive listing of cases adhering to this
approach.
200. McQueen, 814 F.2d at 959. McQueen was decided only two months before the
landmark Supreme Court decision Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
201. 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987).
202. ld. at 958.
203. Id. at 959.
204. Id. at 960; see also State v. Fertig, 668 A.2d 1076, 1078 (NJ. 1996) (noting that
"[h]ypnotically-refreshed testimony is more reliable when the cause of the witness's
memory loss is trauma rather than the passage of time").
205. McQueen, 814 F.2d at 959.
206. State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571, 578 (Idaho 1984).
207. Id. at 577-78.
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B. Rock v. Arkansas: The United States Supreme Court Addresses
the Issue of the Admissibility of Hypnotically
Refreshed Testimony
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether hypnotically refreshed testimony should be admissible in
criminal trials.208 Rock v. Arkansas involved a criminal defendant
who was charged with manslaughter arising from the death of her
husband. 0 9
Vickie Rock's "story" arises out of events that occurred during a
violent domestic dispute one summer night in 1983.210 That evening,
an argument erupted when Frank Rock refused to let his wife have
any pizza and prevented her from leaving their apartment to get any-
thing.else to eat.21' When police arrived at the scene, Frank Rock was
lying on the floor with a bullet wound in his chest.21 2 Vickie Rock told
police that Frank grabbed her by the throat, that she in turn grabbed a
gun, that it went off, and that she did not mean to shoot him. 13 Be-
cause she could not remember the precise details of the shooting,
Vickie Rock's attorney suggested that Rock undergo hypnosis to re-
fresh her recollection. After hypnosis, Vickie Rock was able to re-
member that at the time of the shooting, she had her finger on the
hammer of the gun, but not on the trigger, and that the gun had acci-
dentally fired.a15 At trial, the court issued an order limiting Rock's
testimony to "matters remembered and stated to the examiner prior
to being placed under hypnosis. 2 16 Because the examiner did not
take copious notes during the pre-hypnotic interview, the prosecutor
repeatedly objected to Rock's testimony when she was on the witness
stand.21 7 The result was that " 'ninety-nine percent of everything
[Rock] testified to in the proffer' was inadmissible. ' 2 18 Without hav-
ing had the chance to meaningfully testify-to tell her story-Vickie
Rock was convicted of manslaughter.2 1 9 Rock then appealed to the
United States Supreme Court which vacated the conviction.1 0
A sharply divided Court held that a per se rule excluding all hyp-
notically refreshed testimony infringes impermissibly on a criminal de-
208. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
209. Id at 45.
210. Id
211. Id
212. Id
213. Id. at 46 n.1.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 47.
216. Id
217. Id at 48 n.4.
218. Id. at 48.
219. Id
220. Id at 62.
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fendant's right to testify on her own behalf.2 1 The Court explicitly
stated that "[t]his case does not involve the admissibility of testimony
of previously hypnotized witnesses other than criminal defendants and
we express no opinion on that issue."' n Thus, the only question an-
swered definitively by Rock with respect to hypnotically refreshed tes-
timony is that such testimony is admissible to the extent that it would
otherwise deprive a criminal defendant of her constitutional right to
testify on her own behalf.23
C. Post-Rock Cases and the Trend Towards Inadmissibility of
Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony
Since Rock, courts have continued to determine the admissibility of
hypnotically refreshed testimony of witnesses other than the defend-
ant in criminal trials in at least four different ways. Recently, the
Court declined to resolve this issue.22- The most recent account of the
current trend in the case law is summarized in State v. Fertig:Y
Twenty-six courts now conclude that hypnotically-refreshed testi-
mony is per se inadmissible .... Today, only four states consider
such testimony to be generally admissible .... Many federal courts
evaluate post-hypnotic testimony under a form of the totality-of-
the-circumstances test .... [A] significant number of courts use
procedural safeguards similar to those in Hurd to determine case-
by-case whether hypnotically-refreshed testimony is admissible 26
This section examines the effect of Rock v. Arkansas on jurisdictions
applying the four approaches to the admissibility of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony, and reveals a trend towards the inadmissibility of
hypnotically refreshed testimony across jurisdictions.
221. Id. The criminal defendant's right to testify on her own behalf is grounded in
three distinct provisions of the U.S. Constitution: in the Compulsory Process Clause
of the Sixth Amendment, as a necessary corollary to the Fifth Amendment's guaran-
tee against compelled testimony, and in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 51-53.
222. Id. at 58 n.15 (emphasis added).
223. Some commentators read Rock as standing for the proposition that hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony may be made sufficiently reliable so that witnesses other
than the criminal defendant may also offer such testimony. See e.g., Gill, supra note
14, at 593 (arguing that there is no logical distinction between a criminal defendant
and the witnesses she presents on her behalf and that Rock may be read as legitimiz-
ing the admission of the hypnotically refreshed testimony of defense witnesses other
than the accused).
224. Biskup v. McCaughtry, 20 F.3d 245 (7th Cir. 1994), cerL denied, 116 S. Ct. 1262
(1996).
225. 668 A.2d 1076 (NJ. 1996).
226. Id. at 1081 (citations omitted).
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1. The Effect of Rock on Per Se Admissible Jurisdictions
Since Rock, only one case has been decided in which a per se rule of
admissibility was followed.22 7 In Prime v. State,228 the Wyoming
Supreme Court interpreted the Rock decision as consistent with its
prior decisions1 9 and adhered to the approach that hypnosis raises
issues of credibility rather than admissibility.2 30 The court in Prime
interpreted the Rock decision as legitimizing the use of hypnosis as a
method of refreshing testimony.2 3' Prime is the only decision, how-
ever, to use Rock to defend a per se admissibility approach to hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony.
2. The Effect of Rock on Totality-of-the-Circumstances
Jurisdictions
In Rock, the Court suggested that a "State's legitimate interest in
barring unreliable evidence does not extend to per se exclusions that
may be reliable in an individual case. '' 1 2 Most courts have inter-
preted this statement as requiring a criminal defendant's hypnotically
refreshed testimony to be reviewed under a case-by-case approach.2 33
Indeed, Rock directs the States to establish guidelines to assist trial
courts in evaluating the reliability of testimony that has been hypnoti-
cally refreshed. 3 Some courts have gone a step further, however,
and interpret Rock as standing for the proposition that all hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony must be judged on a case-by-case basis23 5 -
227. Prime v. State, 767 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1989).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 153.
230. Id.
231. See id.
232. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987).
233. Zani v. State, 758 S.W.2d 233, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc). Factors
that may be used to determine the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony of
the defendant include: (1) the utilization of safeguards such as those set forth in
Hurd, (2) corroborating evidence, (3) the opportunity for effective cross-examination
of the defendant, and (4) cautionary instructions given to the jury regarding the dan-
gers of hypnosis on recall. Id. (citing Rock, 483 U.S. at 60-61).
234. Rock, 483 U.S. at 61.
235. Zani, 758 S.W.2d at 243. Employing a "what's good for the goose is good for
the gander" justification for this position, one court has postulated:[I]f safeguards, corroboration and traditional means of testing believability
of eyewitness testimony are deemed sufficient tests of reliability to require
admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony on behalf of the accused in
certain cases, they must also be considered sufficient gauges of reliability to
permit admission of such testimony when proffered by the State in certain
others.
Id. at 243. Another court has suggested:
Although the actual holding of Rock is limited to a rejection of a per se rule
that prevents a defendant from testifying, the language of the opinion has
broader implications ... if the defense witnesses can present hypnotically
enhanced testimony, it is unfair to prevent the prosecution from introducing
such evidence.
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despite the Rock Court's insistence that the opinion was not directed
towards previously hypnotized witnesses other than criminal defend-
ants.2 36 Accordingly, in absence of a criminal defendant's constitu-
tionally protected right to testify on her own behalf, the Rock Court
does not demand intensive investigations in individual cases where the
hypnotically refreshed testimony of the criminal defendant is not in
issue. Moreover, the problems the scientific community has attributed
to hypnosis pose a challenge to this approach as well.2 37 If memory
and hypnosis experts insist that it is impossible-even for an expert-
to determine the reliability of hypnotically refreshed recollection, how
can courts be expected to do so?
3. The Effect of Rock on Jurisdictions Requiring
Adequate Safeguards
The most significant development in the trend towards the inadmis-
sibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony2-8 involves the safeguards
approach to admissibility.23 9 In 1996, the New Jersey Supreme Court,
which promulgated the Hurd guidelines" that have subsequently
been adopted by numerous courts,241 revealed that in an appropriate
case it may abandon Hurd because of the problems hypnotically re-
freshed testimony poses242 and the current trend in the case law to-
wards inadmissibility.24 3 In addition, Dr. Orne, the creator of the
People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1021 (Colo. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 990 (1988).
For post-Rock cases employing a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, see Arm-
strong v. Young, 34 F.3d 421, 428-31 (7th Cir. 1994); Adams v. Leapley, 31 F.3d 713,
713-14 (8th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 754 (1995); Boykin v. Leapley, 28 F.3d
788, 793-94 (8th Cir. 1994); Biskup v. McCaughtry, 20 F.3d 245, 251-54 (7th Cir. 1994);
Beachum v. Tansy, 903 F.2d 1321, 1325-27 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 904
(1990); Haislip v. Roberts, 788 F. Supp. 482, 485-86 (D.C. Kan. 1992), affd, 992 F.2d
1085 (10th Cir. 1993); Chamblee v. State, 527 So. 2d 173, 176 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988);
People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1016 (Colo. 1987); State v. Bainbridge, 787 P.2d
231, 239 (Idaho 1990); State v. Cook, 605 N.E2d 70, 77-78 (Ohio 1992), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 681 (1994); State v. Johnston, 529 N.E.2d 898, 906 (Ohio 1988); State v.
Evans, 450 S.E.2d 47, 51 (S.C. 1994); Spence v. State, 795 S.W.2d 743, 756 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990) (en banc); Horst v. State, 758 S.W.2d 311, 317-18 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
236. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 58 n.15 (1987).
237. See supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
238. See infra notes 246-56 and accompanying text.
239. Since Rock was decided, a number of courts have adopted a safeguards ap-
proach to the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony. See United States v.
Bourgeois, 950 F.2d 980, 985 (5th Cir. 1992); Commonwealth v. Romanelli, 560 A2d
1384, 1386-87 (Pa. 1989); State v. Boykin, 432 N.W.2d 60, 67-68 (S.D. 1988); State v.
Beard, 461 S.E.2d 486, 503 (W. Va. 1995).
240. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 189 & 239 for a listing of cases employing the safeguards ap-
proach to hypnotically refreshed testimony.
242. See State v. Fertig, 668 A2d 1076, 1081 (NJ. 1996). The court indicated that it
was aware of the problems posed by hypnotically-refreshed testimony, but declined to
abandon Hurd without a more complete record. Id
243. Id at 1081.
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Hurd guidelines,'-" has renounced the safeguards'4 5 based on his cur-
rent belief that procedural safeguards are inadequate to ensure a min-
imum level of reliability of hypnotically aided recall.t 6 In admonition
to the courts, Dr. Orne has declared that "hypnosis should not be used
to prepare a witness to testify in court."247
4. The Current Trend Towards the Inadmissibility of Hypnotically
Refreshed Testimony
The current trend towards the inadmissibility of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony stems from judicial skepticism of hypnosis as a
means of reliably refreshing recollection24 8 and the concern that juries
may be misled by "scientifically unreliable" evidence.249 Current per
se inadmissibility approaches,250 like their pre-Rock counterparts,25'
are usually predicated on the "inherent unreliability" of hypnotically
refreshed testimony2 52 under some version of the Frye rule.z  Courts
applying such a rule to the testimony of witnesses other than the crim-
inal defendant distinguish Rock by noting that the only issue the
Court was deciding in Rock was whether a criminal defendant could
offer her own hypnotically refreshed testimony in her defense.2 54
244. State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 89-90 (NJ. 1981).
245. Fertig, 668 A.2d at 1081.
246. Id
247. Id
248. For example, Judge Teague's dissent in Zani v. State referred to hypnotically
refreshed testimony as "irrelevant 'gypsy-voodoo' evidence." 758 S.W.2d 233, 249
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Judge Teague continued his diatribe against hypnosis by
opining that hypnotism "amounts to little more than self-taught 'gypsy-voodooism,'
which ... might be warranted in finding a cure for the hiccoughs but not for finding
the truth of the matter asserted." Il at 250.
249. id at 249. At least one court has voiced its concern that "[m]any laymen be-
lieve that the power of hypnosis, clothed in its veil of mystery, prevents willful decep-
tion." Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (citation omitted).
250. See State v. Sherrill, 799 P.2d 849, 852 (Ariz. 1990); People v. Miller, 790 P.2d
1289, 1303-04 (Cal. 1990); People v. Hayes, 783 P.2d 719, 724 (Cal. 1989); People v.
Johnson, 764 P.2d 1087, 1099-1100 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 829 (1989);
Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188, 196 (Fla. 1989); People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513, 518
(IM. 1989); Peterson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 265, 270 (Ind. 1987); Commonwealth v.
Kater, 567 N.E.2d 885, 888-89 (Mass. 1991); People v. Lee, 537 N.W.2d 233, 239
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Grimmett, 459 N.W.2d 515, 517-18 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990); State v. Post, 901 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Baker, 451
S.E.2d 574, 590-91 (N.C. 1994); State v. Blackmun, 875 S.W.2d 122, 143 (N.C. 1994);
State v. Annadale, 406 S.E.2d 837, 845 (N.C. 1991); State v. Munson, 886 P.2d 999,
1003 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Commonwealth v. Laskaris, 561 A.2d 16, 23 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989); Hall v. Commonwealth, 403 S.E.2d 362, 370 (Va. Ct. App. 1991);
State v. Coe, 750 P.2d 208, 211 (Wash. 1988).
251. See supra note 181.
252. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
254. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 58 n.15 (1987). For examples of cases distin-
guishing Rock, see State v. Pollitt, 530 A.2d 155, 164 n.6 (Conn. 1987) (noting the
Rock Court's insistence that the only issue the Court was addressing was the admissi-
bility of a criminal defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony); Stokes v. State, 548
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Most jurisdictions adhering to a per se inadmissibility approach to
hypnotically refreshed testimony carve out an exception for pre-hyp-
notic testimony.5 5 Under such an approach, witnesses are permitted
to testify to matters they remembered prior to hypnosis if a record of
such pre-hypnotic recollection exists.256
If a court finds that a per se inadmissibility approach to hypnotically
refreshed testimony yields an unpalatable result in an individual case,
there are at least two ways the court may circumvent the per se exclu-
sion. First, a court may find that no hypnosis occurred, and therefore,
the per se exclusion does not apply to the case before it?-"
So. 2d 188, 196 .9 (Fla. 1989) (stating that "the Court's decision in Rock was ex-
pressly limited to the testimony of criminal defendants, and therefore, may have no
effect on the state court's decision to exclude testimony of another witness" (citation
omitted)); People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513, 519 (Ill. 1989) (noting that Rock does not
preclude the court from per se excluding the hypnotically refreshed testimony of a
witness other than the criminal defendant); Hall v. Commonwealth, 403 S.E.2d 362,
367 (Va. App. 1991) ("[T]he United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue
of whether, in a criminal proceeding, the hypnotically refreshed testimony of a wit-
ness other than the defendant is admissible."); State v. Coe, 750 P.2d 208, 212 (Wash.
1988) (noting that because the Rock decision "is expressly limited to the testimony of
criminal defendants, it has no effect upon our decision here regarding post hypnotic
testimony of other witnesses").
255. See, eg., State v. Sherrill, 799 P.2d 849, 851-52 (Ariz. 1990) (reaffirming the
holding of Collins II which "intended to elucidate a bright line rule: post-hypnotic
recall is inadmissible, but pre-hypnotic recall is admissible provided it has been re-
corded prior to hypnosis"); People v. Hayes, 783 P.2d 719, 727-28 (Cal. 1989) (al-
lowing pre-hypnotic testimony to be admitted if statutory safeguards are satisfied);
People v. Lee, 537 N.W.2d 233,239 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the testimony
of previously hypnotized witnesses was properly admitted because such testimony was
limited to their pre-hypnotic recollections); State v. Grimmett, 459 N.W.2d 515, 518
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (admitting testimony of pre-hypnotic recollection if such recall
conforms to the witness' pre-hypnotic statement of events); State v. Blackman, 875
S.W.2d 122, 143 (N.C. 1994) (permitting the witness to testify regarding matters recal-
led prior to hypnosis); State v. Annadale, 406 S.E.2d 837, 845 (N.C. 1991) (allowing
testimony of previously hypnotized witness where the post-hypnotic testimony
matched the pre-hypnotic statement); Hall v. Commonwealth, 403 S.E.2d 362, 370-71
(Va. Ct. App. 1991) (adopting a per se rule of inadmissibility while carving out an
exception for pre-hypnotic testimony).
256. See supra note 255 for jurisdictions recognizing this exception.
257. See State v. Joly, 593 A.2d 96 (Conn. 1991). This case involved the murder of a
fifteen-year-old girl whose death was caused by a fractured skull. At at 98. She was
found in the woods near the Pequabuck River. Id The State's case against the de-
fendant was comprised of circumstantial evidence including the hypnotically re-
freshed testimony of an eyewitness who claimed to have seen the "defendant alone
with the victim in the immediate area of the woods between 2:30 and 3:45 p.m. on the
date of her death." Id at 99. The witness, in this case, was hypnotized with the hope
of obtaining a more detailed description of the defendant. Id. The witness' pre-hyp-
notic statement to police of the perpetrator was lost. Id. Without such a statement,
there was no way to determine the scope of the witness' pre-hypnotic recollection,
which may be admitted where recollection refreshed by hypnosis may not. State v.
Pollitt, 530 A.2d 155, 165 (Conn. 1987). Because such an error is subject to reversal,
the State argued that although undergoing hypnosis, the witness was never actually
hypnotized, and therefore admission of the witness' testimony was not "the unreliable
product of hypnosis." Joly, 593 A.2d at 98. To defend this position, the State offered
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Second, a reviewing court may find that it was error to admit such
testimony, but that the error was harmless.- 8
III. A RATIONALE FOR DISTINGUISHING THE CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT FROM ANY OTHER WITNESS
This part argues that the criminal defendant has a powerful auton-
omy interest when she testifies on her own behalf, and that the respect
for this interest is the driving force of the Rock opinion. After dis-
cussing the jurisprudence of autonomy, this part proposes a three pro-
nged test that courts should employ when determining whether the
accused's right to testify has been properly secured. In order to illus-
trate the principles embodied in the admissibility analysis, this part
then applies each strand of the analysis to post-Rock cases in which
the criminal defendant's right to testify was at issue. Because the pre-
dominant theme of this Note is that the criminal defendant has a right
to tell her "story" before she succumbs to the law, this part closes by
examining two instances in which criminal defendants were permitted
to tell their stories, and discusses the effect that the proposed admissi-
bility test would have had on their cases.
A. Rock v. Arkansas Revisited
Witnesses testify to assist the jury in determining questions of
factlg-in other words, to present reliable testimony into evidence.260
Consequently, if a court deems a witness incompetent-not legally fit
to present reliable testimony-she will not be permitted to testify. As
a policy matter then, the interest served by allowing witnesses to tes-
tify is that of reliability. Because hypnotically refreshed testimony is
"inherently unreliable," such testimony should never be presented for
the purpose of admitting reliable testimony into evidence. Therefore,
the witness' opinion that he was never hypnotized-that he, in fact, feigned hypnosis
because of "the attitude problem we were having with the police." Id. at 100. Relying
on the witness' assertion that he had feigned hypnosis, the trial court found that no
hypnotism occurred. ki. at 102. As a result, the admissibility problems associated with
hypnotically refreshed testimony were circumvented. The Connecticut Supreme
Court agreed with the trial court and upheld the conviction. Id.; see also People v.
Caro, 761 P.2d 680, 688 (Cal. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1040 (1989) (upholding the
trial court's determination that no hypnosis occurred based on hypnotist's opinion
and admitting the testimony); State v. Grimmett, 459 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990) (rejecting the State's argument that the witness was not successfully hyp-
notized during her therapy sessions, and therefore, concluding that her hypnotically
refreshed testimony was admissible).
258. See People v. Johnson, 764 P.2d 1087, 1100-01 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 829 (1989); State v. Hall, 403 S.E.2d 362, 373 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
259. See People v. Ruiz, 419 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (1979).
260. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) ("[A] wit-
ness who testifies to a fact which can be perceived by the senses must have had an
opportunity to observe, and must have actually observed the fact [due to] common
law insistence upon 'the most reliable sources of information.' " (citation omitted)).
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as a general matter, witnesses should not be hypnotized for purposes
of refreshing recollection as to matters to be testified to and then sub-
sequently offer testimony in a court of law.
In Rock v. Arkansas,2 61 the Court indicated that there is something
unique about the criminal defendant as a witness.26- In striking down
a state rule "designed to ensure trustworthy evidence"0 because such
a rule "interfered with the ability of a defendant to offer testi-
mony,"'- 4 the Court acknowledged that the interest present when a
criminal defendant testifies on her own behalf is more complex than a
straightforward policy that evidence should be reliable3m
As discussed supra, Rock involved a criminal defendant who was
charged with manslaughter arising from the death of her husband.2 "
A sharply divided court held that a per se rule excluding a criminal
defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony infringes impermissibly
on her right to testify on her own behalf.267
The Court recognized the importance that the accused be given the
opportunity to speak in an "unfettered exercise" of her own will'- s
and grounded the criminal defendant's right to testify in three distinct
constitutional provisions: 6 9 in the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment,270 as a necessary corollary to the Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee against compelled testimony,2 71  and in the
Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 27-
Foremost, the Court reasoned that the right to testify is "one of the
rights that 'are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary pro-
cess' "273 because the "necessary ingredients of the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of liberty with-
out due process of law include a right to be heard and offer testi-
mony."'' 4 Due Process grants a criminal defendant a right to "her day
in court,"' a right that is basic to our system of jurisprudence." 6
261. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
262. One student author remarks, "[t]he Court attached great significance to the
difference between an accused and those of other witnesses." Traynor, supra note 68,
at 820. Traynor did not, however, suggest what the difference may be.
263. Rock, 483 U.S. at 53.
264. Id.
265. See infra notes 284-309 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 209-20 and accompanying text.
267. Rock, 483 U.S. at 62. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of the United States
vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Arkansas Supreme Court. Id.
268. Id. at 53 (citation omitted).
269. Id. at 51-53.
270. Rock, 483 U.S. at 51; U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
271. Rock, 483 U.S. at 52-53; U.S. Const. amend. V.
272. Rock, 483 U.S. at 52; U.S. Const. amend. VI.
273. Id. at 51 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975)).
274. Id. (emphasis added).
275. Id.
276. Id.
2185
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Therefore, the "right to be heard" is conferred upon the criminal de-
fendant out of respect for the inherent dignity of the individual.
The Court also grounded the accused's right to testify in the Fifth
Amendment.277 The Fifth Amendment prevents the government
from compelling a criminal defendant to either incriminate herself or
perjure herself by granting her the right "to remain silent unless [s]he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of [her] own will."278 Ac-
cordingly, the guiding force of the Fifth Amendment, like that of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is respect for the individual's sense of
dignity.
Finally, the Court grounded the accused's right to testify in the
Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment.27 9 The Com-
pulsory Process Clause grants the criminal defendant the right to call
witnesses in her favor.280 Likening the criminal defendant to other
witnesses she may present in her defense, the Court reasoned that a
defendant's opportunity to conduct her own defense by calling wit-
nesses is incomplete if she may not present herself as a witness. 281
The Court's reasoning on this point is inconsistent with the general
theme of the opinion, however.
The overarching theme of the Court's opinion is that there is some-
thing unique about the criminal defendant as a witness.21 Indeed, the
Court grounded the accused's right to testify in three constitutional
amendments that are geared towards protecting the accused's rights in
a criminal trial. Moreover, comparable constitutional support is not
available to witnesses other than the accused. Therefore, it is the rec-
ognition of the unique position of the criminal defendant coupled with
the respect for the inherent dignity of the individual that guides the
Court to hold for the first time ever that a criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to testify on her own behalf.28 3
The Court falters then when it bases the right to testify on the Com-
pulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment by analogizing the
277. Id. at 52.
278. Id. at 53.
279. Ia at 52.
280. I.
281. I.
282. See supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
283. See Louis M. Holscher, The Legacy of Rock v. Arkansas: Protecting Criminal
Defendants' Right to Testify in Their Own Behalf, 19 New. Eng. J. Crim. & Civ. Con-
finement 223, 226 (1993) ("Whether a defendant has a constitutional right to testify
was not resolved authoritatively... until the Rock decision."). Tracing the historical
development of the criminal defendant's right to testify, Holscher notes:
By the late 1600s, courts had repudiated the belief that a defendant's state-
ments could be considered as testimony, and during the 1700s the general
rule was that a defendant was incompetent to testify .... By the end of the
19th Century, all states except Georgia had enacted statutes that declared
criminal defendants competent to testify .... The privilege of criminal de-
fendants to testify in their own defense.., has now developed into a consti-
tutional right protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
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accused to other witnesses she may present in her defense. The ac-
cused is arguably distinct from any other witness that either the de-
fense or the prosecution may introduce in a criminal trial. It is only
the accused that the Constitution entitles to due process of law, prom-
ising that she will receive "her day in court." Moreover, it is solely the
accused that the Constitution grants the right to decide whether or not
to testify. Furthermore, it is exclusively the privilege of the accused to
have a complete defense. Clearly then, although partially misguided,
the Court's compulsion to ground the accused's right to testify in three
distinct Constitutional provisions indicates that a powerful interest is
present when the accused testifies. The following section identifies
this interest as autonomy.
B. Autonomy: The Touchstone of the Criminal Defendant's Right
to Testify on Her Own Behalf
Autonomy, the jurisprudence of which is discussed in this section,
has been defined as "the purported metaphysical foundation of peo-
ple's capacity and also their right to make and act on their own deci-
sions, even if those decisions are ill-considered and substantively
unwise."'28 An individual's sense of autonomy encompasses the inter-
est of self-government.' s3 Central to the ability to govern oneself is
the capacity to speak on one's own behalf. In order to secure the
accused's autonomy interest in testifying on her own behalf, this sec-
tion proposes an admissibility analysis that courts should apply when a
criminal defendant's right to testify is at stake.
1. The Contemplation of Autonomy
Autonomy may be characterized as an individual's interest in gov-
erning herself as she sees fit and in directing her destiny as she so
determines. 6 Within the context of a criminal prosecution, the ac-
cused may exercise her autonomy interest in various ways. For exam-
ple, a criminal defendant has the right to appear pro se at her trial.' s7
This right exists as an affirmation of the "dignity and autonomy of the
accused."'2 In Faretta v. California,-8 9 the Court held that a criminal
Id. at 226-28. For another account of the historical development of the criminal de-
fendant's right to testify, see Kimbro Stephens, Rock v. Arkansas: Hypnosis and the
Criminal Defendant's Right to Testify, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 425, 431-37 (1988).
284. Richard H. Fallon, Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 Stan. L Rev. 875, 878 (1994).
285. Id.
286. See United States ex reL Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007; Fallon, supra note 284, at 878.
287. See, e.g., McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984) (commenting that
the right to proceed pro se may be undermined by "unsolicited and excessively intru-
sive participation by standby counsel"). Furthermore, the right to speak on one's own
behalf "entails more than the opportunity to add one's voice to a cacophony of
others." Id. at 177.
288. did at 176-77.
289. 422 U.S. 806 (1974).
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defendant has an independent constitutional right of self-representa-
tion.2 90 Finding this right in the structure of the Sixth Amendment,29'
the Court held that the "Sixth Amendment does not provide merely
that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused
personally the right to make his defense. ' '2 1 As a result, Faretta per-
mits the criminal defendant to make the personal decision to refuse
appointed counsel and represent herself, if that is her wish.293 Faretta
reasons that if the government were allowed to "force '2 94 counsel
upon the accused, counsel would then be acting not as an "assis-
tant,"295 but as the "master ' 296 of the accused.297 Significantly, Faretta
recognizes that although a criminal defendant may conduct her own
defense ultimately to her own detriment, her "choice must be honored
out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the
law.' "29 Accordingly, Faretta confers through the Sixth Amendment
a right of self-representation upon a criminal defendant out of respect
for the autonomy interest of the accused.299
The Court did not contend, however, that the autonomy interest of
the accused is absolute.30 0 The court conceded that "the right of self-
representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom
.. [nor] is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural
and substantive law. ' 3 1 Therefore, in the appropriate case, the crimi-
nal defendant's autonomy interest may be limited.3°
290. Id. at 807.
291. Id. at 821 (stating that "[t]he Sixth Amendment, when naturally read, thus im-
plies a right of self-representation" (emphasis added)).
292. Id. at 819 (emphasis added).
293. See id.
294. Id. at 807.
295. Id. at 820.
296. Id.
297. Id; see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 (1983) ("[T]he function of coun-
sel under the Sixth Amendment is to protect the dignity and autonomy of a person on
trial by 'assisting' h[er] in making choices that are h[ers] to make, not to make choices
for h[er]."(emphasis omitted)).
298. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 (emphasis added) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337, 350-51 (1970)). Referring to the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
a complete defense, the Court notes, "to deny h[er] in the exercise of h[er] free choice
the right to dispense with some of these safeguards... is to imprison a [wo]man in
h[er] privileges and call it the Constitution." Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
299. See United States ex. rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966) (noting that "even in cases where the accused is
harming h[er]self by insisting on conducting h[er] own defense, respect for individual
autonomy requires that [s]he be allowed to go to jail under h[er] own banner if [s]he
so desires").
300. Id
301. Id
302. Upon granting Faretta the opportunity to represent himself, the trial judge
explained to him: "We are going to treat you like a gentleman. We are going to
respect you. We are going to give you every chance, but you are going to play with
the same ground rules that anybody plays." Id. at 808 n.2. Faretta was unable to
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In his dissent in Faretta, Justice Blackmun characterized the major-
ity opinion as acknowledging that society's interest in obtaining a just
result in a criminal prosecution3 0 3 does not outweigh the individual
criminal defendant's autonomy interest.30 Accordingly, if Black-
mun's opinion is credited, the fact that, upon balancing these compet-
ing interests, the majority of the Court concluded that the individual
criminal defendant's interest outweighed the interests of society as a
whole demonstrates that although not absolute, the autonomy interest
of the accused is powerful.
In a broader sense, Faretta indicates that an accused may exercise
her autonomy interest not only by conducting her own defense but
also by participating in it:
Implicit in Faretta is the notion that when society, through its gov-
ernment, brings an individual before the court to face criminal
charges, "that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the
law" requires that the defendant be allowed, if [s]he so desires, to
speak directly to h[er] accusers, and the court and jury that will de-
cide h[er] fate.305
The Court's recognition of justice's respect for the individual as pro-
viding the foundation for a criminal defendant's right to testify indi-
cates an equally significant autonomy interest in presenting such
testimony.
In Riggins v. Nevada,306 the Court held that the forced administra-
tion of antipsychotic medication during the defendant's trial violated
demonstrate that he had adequate knowledge of the law, however, and the judge
reversed his earlier ruling and appointed a public defender to represent Faretta. Id. at
808-10.
303. Id. at 849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
304. Id. at 851. In his dissent, Blackmun criticizes the majority of the court for
holding "that self-representation must be allowed despite the obvious dangers of un-
just convictions in order to protect the individual defendant's right of free choice." Id.
Drawing his tirade against the majority opinion to a poignant close, Blackmun de-
clared, "If there is any truth to the old proverb that 'one who is h[er] own lawyer has a
fool for a client,' the Court by its opinion today now bestows a constitutional right on
one to make a fool of h[er]self." Id. at 852 (emphasis omitted).
305. United States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752, 759 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated for rehear-
ing en banc, 932 F.2d 899 (1991), affd, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532 (1992) (reaffirming that
the criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify in her own behalf). Under
Teague 11, the principles espoused in Teague I remain unchanged:
In making the choice on whether to testify, just as the choice on whether to
represent [her]self, the defendant elects whether to become an active partici-
pant in the proceeding that affects h[er] life and liberty and to inject h[er]
own action, voice and personality into the process to the extent the system
permits.... To deny a defendant the right to tell h[er] story from the stand
dehumanizes the administration of justice. I cannot accept a decision that
allows a jury to condemn to death or imprisonment a defendant who desires
to speak, without ever having heard the sound of h[er] voice.
Teague 11, 953 F.2d at 1532 (quoting Justice Godbold's impassioned dissent in Wright
v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1078, 1081 (1978) (emphasis added)).
306. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
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rights guaranteed by the Sixth30 7 and Fourteenth Amendments.30 8
Explaining how the forced administration of Mellaril infringed on the
defendant's right to testify, the court stated:
It is clearly possible that such side effects [impacted] not just Rig-
gins' outward appearance, but also the content of his testimony on
direct [and] cross-examination .... We also are persuaded that
allowing Riggins to present expert testimony about the effect of
Mellaril on his demeanor did nothing to cure the possibility that the
substance of his own testimony ... [was] compromised by forced
administration of Mellaril.30 9
This statement illustrates that the United States Supreme Court ac-
knowledges the importance of the accused's right to tell her story in
her own words, and the autonomy interest this right naturally implies.
Conceding that an accused has an autonomy interest in testifying on
her own behalf, how should courts determine if this interest has been
respected?
2. Protecting the Criminal Defendant's Right to Testify: A
Proposed Test of Admissibility
In order to determine whether a criminal defendant's right to testify
has been protected, this Note proposes a three-pronged test. Because
the right to testify is intended to confer upon the criminal defendant
the opportunity to confront her accusers by telling them her "story,"
the appropriate analysis should be tailored to protect this interest.
First, the criminal defendant should have had the opportunity to
present her defense "in her own words. '310 This inquiry is necessary
to determine if the accused's autonomy interest in presenting testi-
mony on her own behalf was properly respected. Second, this privi-
lege should only apply to live testimony the criminal defendant
personally offers from the witness stand.31 ' This requirement is neces-
sary because although Rock held that a defendant's testimony is not
subject to per se exclusions, 1 reliability is still a factor in determining
whether the accused will be permitted to testify in an individual
case.31 3 When an accused takes the stand, the elements of confronta-
tion-the oath, cross-examination, and observation of the witness' de-
307. Defendant's core contention was that the involuntary administration of Mel-
laril, an antipsychotic medication, denied him a full and fair trial. Id. at 133.
308. "The forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body...
represents a substantial interference with that person's liberty." Id. at 134 (quoting
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)).
309. 1d at 137-38 (emphasis added) (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
229 (1990)).
310. See infra notes 317-36 and accompanying text.
311. See infra notes 337-54 and accompanying text.
312. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987).
313. See id.
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meanor-function as safeguards of reliability.314 Third, the State's
interest in barring the testimony should be balanced against the de-
fendant's right to testify on her own behalf.315 For example, when a
criminal defendant seeks to offer her own hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony, the State's interest may be the interest to exclude unreliable
testimony, the inquiry being the extent to which the proffered testi-
mony is reliable.3'6
3. The Admissibility Test Applied to Post-Rock Cases Involving
the Defendant's Right to Testify
This subsection explores the three strands of the admissibility analy-
sis presented supra. In order to illustrate the principles embodied by
each prong of the analysis, each strand is applied to cases in which the
accused's right to testify was at issue.
a. "In Her Own Words:" The Polygraph & Truth Serum Cases
Most courts approach the issue of determining whether a criminal
defendant has been deprived of her constitutional right to testify on
her own behalf by examining whether she was able to present her de-
fense "in her own words." For example, Haakanson v. State317 in-
volved a criminal defendant convicted of ten counts of sexual abuse of
a minor in the first degree.31 8 Haakanson appealed the conviction,
contending that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the results of
a polygraph test that he had taken.319 Haakanson denied any sexual
contact with the three complainants during the polygraph examina-
tion.320 The examiner testified that, in his professional opinion, the
results of the polygraph test indicated that Haakansan's denial was
truthful.32' The trial court, however, refused to admit the test results
because the polygraph examination did not meet the Frye test for
novel scientific evidence.32 The appellate court upheld this determi-
nation, defending its position by commenting that "Haakanson was
not prohibited from presenting his own version of the facts through his
testimony. He was merely precluded from presenting evidence of his
polygraph examination." 32  Accordingly, the court concluded that
314. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990).
315. See infra notes 355-74 and accompanying text.
316. Rock, 483 U.S. at 61.
317. 760 P.2d 1030 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
318. Id. at 1031.
319. l
320. Id at 1032.
321. Id.
322. Id at 1034-35.
323. Id. at 1034 n.3 (emphasis added).
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"unlike the criminal defendant in Rock, Haakanson's right to testify
was not abridged. 32 4
Implicit in the court's holding is the recognition that a criminal de-
fendant's testimony serves a purpose other than presenting reliable
evidence.3z In Haakanson, the court acknowledged that while the
criminal defendant's right to testify does not afford her the privilege
to present unreliable evidence, such right nevertheless grants her the
opportunity to present her own version of the facts through her testi-
mony. Arguably then, the accused's right to "tell her story" is not
predicated upon the notion that her story will be entirely reliable, but
that her story must be told in order to preserve the her autonomy
interest. This notion explains why the hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony of the accused must be admitted, whereas polygraph results of
the accused are not protected by a similar constitutional guarantee.
A similar analysis is appropriate when the accused seeks to present
evidence pertaining to truth serum results.326 "Truth serum" is sup-
posed to lower inhibitions in the conscious mind and allow the subject
to speak freely.327 For example, Cogbum v. State328 involved a crimi-
nal defendant, accused of sexually abusing his daughter,329 who sought
to admit the testimony of an expert that performed an amytal inter-
view330 on the defendant. In a pre-trial deposition, the doctor stated
that "[w]hile under the influence of the truth serum . . . Cogburn
achieved a hypnotic state and denied having sexual contact or experi-
ence with the victim."' 331 The doctor concluded that, in his profes-
sional opinion, the test provided evidence in favor of Cogburn's
324. Id Haakanson's conviction was reversed on other grounds, however. Id. at
1039.
325. Another case illustrating this principle is Misskelley v. State. 915 S.W.2d 702,
(Ark. 1996), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 246 (1996). In this case, the criminal defendant
cited Rock v. Arkansas as standing for the proposition that "evidence which might
ordinarily be considered unreliable is admissible to protect a defendant's constitu-
tional rights." Id. at 715. The defendant used this argument in order to persuade the
court to admit an expert's opinion pertaining to the results of the defendant's poly-
graph examination. Id. at 714-15. The court distinguished Rock from the circum-
stances before it by declaring that Rock only applies to the criminal defendant's
testimony and not to the testimony of other witnesses. Id. at 715. Due to this distinc-
tion, such an argument, which this Note contends may be successful in the appropriate
case, failed in Miskelley. In restricting Rock's application to a criminal defendant's
testimony, the Arkansas Supreme Court implicitly recognized the first strand of the
admissibility test proposed in this Note-specifically, that autonomy need not be
guarded where testimony is not "in the accused's own words."
326. Cogbum v. State, 732 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Ark. 1987) ("Truth serum tests are
generally held to occupy the same position as polygraph tests and most courts do not
recognize the admissibility of either test for the purpose of proving the truth of the
matter asserted.").
327. Id.
328. 732 S.W.2d 807 (Ark. 1987).
329. Id. at 808.
330. An amytal interview refers to the administration of truth serum. Id. at 812.
331. Id.
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innocence.332 The State then filed a motion in limine to suppress the
doctor's testimony.333 The trial court granted the motion,3  and the
Arkansas Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the trial court's deci-
sion to suppress the testimony.335 In affirming the determination to
suppress the expert's testimony involving the results of Cogburn's
truth serum test, the court noted that under the majority rule, the re-
sults of truth serum tests are inadmissible. 33 Because the results of
truth serum tests do not constitute testimony of an accused "in her
own words," these results are not protected by the criminal defend-
ant's constitutional right to testify. In addition, truth serum results do
not constitute "live testimony of an accused" which is the second
prong of the admissibility analysis this Note proposes, and which is set
out in the next subsection.
b. "Live Testimony Personally Offered by the Accused:" The
Insanity Plea Cases
In some instances, defendants have attempted to admit pre-trial in-
terviews taken of the accused based on the constitutional right to tes-
tify-"3 These scenarios typically involve out-of-court interviews with
defendants while they are under the influence of truth serum or hyp-
nosis in order to establish an insanity defense.338 The problem with
admitting such interviews is apparent-it would allow the accused to
"smuggle in" testimony without having to be subjected to cross-exami-
nation.339 Therefore, a criminal defendant's autonomy interest ap-
plies only to live testimony offered by the accused.311 Tracing the
language of Rock v. Arkansas,"' as the "opportunity to testify is... a
necessary corollary to the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against com-
pelled testimony," 2 so is the duty to defend her story a "necessary
corollary" to the constitutional guarantee that an accused may tell her
story in the first place.
State v. Alley4 3 illustrates this principle. In Alley, the criminal de-
fendant was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and aggra-
vated rape and sentenced to death.' Defendant appealed alleging
numerous errors including the trial court's decision to exclude video-
332. Id.
333. ld.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990);
United States v. Stark, 24 MJ. 381 (C.M.A. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988).
338. Id
339. See Stark, 24 MJ. at 384.
340. See State v. L.K., 582 A.2d 297, 306 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
341. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
342. Id. at 52.
343. 776 S.W.2d 506 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1038 (1990).
344. Id. at 508.
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taped hypnotic and sodium amytal interviews of the defendant from
the jury's consideration.345 Alley argued that viewing the tapes would
assist the jury's understanding of his diagnosis 346 of multiple personal-
ity disorder. 3 7 This diagnosis would "raise the issue of his sanity and
shift the burden to the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and had the
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." 3 8
The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision to ex-
clude the videotaped interviews of the defendant 34 9 which was based
on the finding that such tapes were "sensational '350 and "unrelia-
ble ' 351 and that Alley was a "malingerer. '352
Under the admissibility analysis proposed by this Note, videotaped
interviews of the defendant unquestionably include testimony "in the
defendant's own words," and therefore, satisfy the first prong of the
admissibility analysis. Such testimony fails, however, to satisfy the
second prong of the test because a videotaped interview does not con-
stitute "live testimony of an accused." Alley highlights the necessity
of this requirement. In Alley, if the pre-trial interviews in which the
defendant told a sensational story were admitted, the defendant
would have escaped cross-examination. Consequently, the accused's
duty to defend her story-the natural and necessary corollary to the
right to tell it in the first place353 -would have been circumvented.
Under such circumstances, fairness would be compromised, and injus-
tice would result. Therefore, the accused must offer "live testimony"
in order to preserve her autonomy interest.354
345. Id at 515.
346. Id
347. Id at 510. During the pre-trial sodium amytal and hypnosis interviews, two
alternate personalities were revealed. Id Defendant alleged that his alternate person-
alities "Power"-who also answered to the name "Death"-and "Billie" were in con-
trol at the time of the offense. Id.
348. Id
349. Id at 516.
350. Id at 515.
351. Id
352. Id at 511.
353. See supra notes 328-29 and accompanying text.
354. United States v. Stark provides another example of this problem. 24 MJ. 381
(C.M.A. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988). In this case, the United States Mili-
tary Court of Appeals upheld the general court-martial's conviction of the defendant
for the unpremeditated murder of his wife. Id at 381. In convicting the defendant,
the general court-martial determined that videotapes of a psychiatrist's interviews
with the accused were inadmissible. Id at 385. The defendant wanted the tapes ad-
mitted to help court members evaluate the psychiatrist's opinion that defendant either
lacked mental responsibility or was insane at the time of the killing. Id. at 384. The
U.S. Military Court of Appeals agreed with the general court-martial that admitting
the tapes into evidence would permit the defendant to "smuggle" hearsay evidence
before the court. Id at 385. Distinguishing Rock v. Arkansas from the case before it,
the court noted that "there was no limitation on [the defendant's] ability to testify in
his own defense." Id. This statement indicates that the court in Stark recognized, if
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c. "When Justice Must Censor Her Story:" Limitations on the
Autonomy Interest of the Accused
The criminal defendant's autonomy interest in presenting testimony
on her own behalf is not absolute.355 Rock v. Arkansas recognized
that the right may in the appropriate case be limited by other legiti-
mate interests in the criminal trial process.35 6 The Court also noted,
however, that restrictions on a defendant's right to testify may not be
"arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
serve." 357 A State has a legitimate interest, for example, in excluding
unreliable evidence. Likewise, a State may have other legitimate in-
terests that supersede the accused's right to testify that justify censor-
ing the accused's story.
The interplay between the criminal defendant's and the State's in-
terests are highlighted by Stephens v. Miller35 ' which involved a Rape
Shield Statute35 9 that conflicted with the accused's right to testify.
The statute hindered the defendant's ability to "present his own ver-
sion of events in his own words."36' Stephens was convicted of at-
tempted rape after the trial court excluded statements that Stephens
claims he made during the events that led to his conviction.62' The
case against Stephens was a classic case of conflicting stories. Ste-
phens claimed that M.W., the alleged victim, consented to sexual ac-
tivity363 whereas M.W. insisted that no consent was given to the
defendant.3 1 Pursuant to the Indiana Rape Statute,36 the trial court
prevented the defendant from testifying that "the two of them were
'doing it doggy fashion' when he said to her '[d]on't you like it like
this? ... [T.H.] said you did' "136 and that "he said something to
only implicitly, the importance that an accused be provided the opportunity to tell her
story in her own words.
355. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55-56. There is no constitutional right, for
example, to commit perjury. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993).
356. 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987).
357. Rock, 483 U.S. at 56.
358. 13 F.3d 998 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cerL denied, 115 S. Ct. 57 (1994).
359. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-37-4-4 (Bums 1994). Under this statute, counsel may not
inquire into matters concerning the victim's sexual history.
360. Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1000-01.
361. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987).
362. Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1000.
363. The defendant claimed that M.W. invited him into her trailer to talk in the
living room. Id. According to the defendant, he asked if he could kiss her and then
"[o]ne thing led to another... until the two of them ended up on the floor as two
consenting adults engaged in sexual intercourse." Id.
364. M.W.'s story differed markedly from the defendant's. M.W. claimed that she
forgot to lock the door prior to falling asleep on the living room couch. Id. When she
awoke, she found the defendant in her trailer who then attempted to make sexual
advances on her. Id. M.W. claims that she pushed him off her and ran screaming into
her sister's bedroom, while the defendant made a hasty exit out the front door. Id.
365. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-37-4-4 (Burns 1994).
366. Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1000.
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[M.W.] about 'switching partners.' "367 The court did, however, per-
mit the defendant to testify that "he said something to [M.W.] that
angered her and led her to fabricate the attempted rape charge. '368
After the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, the de-
fendant appealed to the Seventh Circuit contending that the Indiana
court erred in excluding the proffered testimony.369 Stephens's main
argument was that "Indiana denied him his constitutional right to tes-
tify in his own defense when it did not allow him to tell his version of
the events, in their entirety and in his own words, about what hap-
pened"37 ° that night at M.W.'s trailer.
Applying the admissibility test to this case, the defendant unques-
tionably satisfied the first two prongs: (1) that such testimony be "in
his own words" and (2) that the right to tell his story applies only to
"live testimony" from the defendant. The accused in this example,
however, failed to satisfy the third prong of the analysis proposed by
this Note-that there be no legitimate State interest that outweighs
the defendant's right to testify. Tracing the language of Rock, the Sev-
enth Circuit in Stephens found that "the [trial] court did nothing arbi-
trary or disproportionate to the purposes the Indiana Rape Shield
Statute was designed to serve when it excluded 'doggy fashion' and
'partner switching' statements."'371 The Seventh Circuit noted further
that "the Indiana Rape Shield Statute was enacted to prevent just this
kind of generalized inquiry into the reputation or past sexual conduct
of the victim in order to avoid embarrassing her and subjecting her to
possible public denigration. ' 372 The Seventh Circuit determined that
the trial court "properly balanced" the competing rights of the State in
protecting victims from embarrassment and public denigration and
the defendant in testifying on his own behalf.373 Accordingly, the Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that the State's interest served by the Indiana
Rape Shield Statute justified "this very minor imposition on Stephens'
right to testify."374
367. Id
368. Id at 1001.
369. Id at 1001-02. Stephens argued that "the Indiana court violated the federal
constitution when it excluded his statements about 'doggy fashion' sexual intercourse
and partner switching." Id.
370. Id at 1001.
371. Iad at 1002.
372. Id (citations omitted).
373. Idt The Seventh Circuit noted that "the Indiana trial court properly balanced
Stephens' right to testify with Indiana's interests because it allowed him to testify
about what happened and that he said something to upset [M.W.]." Id.
374. Id
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C. Criminal Defendants and the Stories They Tell: Towards
Admitting the Accused's Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony
"Stories are one way to bring law down to life.... " 375
There is a movement in legal scholarship referred to as "legal story-
telling" which argues that "law should concern itself more with the
concrete lives of persons affected by it."'3 76 The key term in this dis-
course is "empathy."'3 " Undoubtedly, this principle is already embod-
ied-at least to some degree-in legal scholarship. In law school class
rooms, for example, we study not disembodied, abstract legal princi-
ples; rather, we study the application of these rules to concrete in-
stances-stories, if you will-as exemplified in case law. We study
actual cases because, on the most basic level, it is through "stories"
that we construct our understanding of the world in which we live.
Stated simply, it is through stories that we learn.
And so why should the accused not be given this opportunity to
relate to her accusers in this most fundamental and human way? And
why should we, as her accusers, be prevented from learning from the
lessons embedded in her story-lessons that may be revealed simply
by allowing her to speak?
This section argues that it is imperative that courts acknowledge the
constitutional considerations at stake when determining whether or
not to admit the testimony of an accused. Concededly, the analysis
becomes complicated when the accused seeks to admit testimony that
has been hypnotically refreshed, and the proposed admissibility test is
tailored to address such intricacies. In order to illustrate the potential
consequences of the admissibility analysis on cases involving the hyp-
notically refreshed testimony of criminal defendants, this section
presents the stories of two such criminal defendants and then applies
the analysis to both cases.
1. State v. Butterworth:378 "I'm a Coward, Not a Killer"
State v. Butterworth involved a criminal defendant charged with
three counts of first-degree murder.379 On New Year's Eve in 1987,
Melvin P. Fager and his daughters, Sherri and Kelli, were found dead
in their home in Wichita, Kansas.38 0 The family car was missing-as
well as Butterworth-who had been employed by the Fagers' to build
a solarium adjoining their home.38 Three days after the Fagers' bod-
ies were found, Butterworth telephoned his wife from Florida who
375. Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New
Words, Old Wounds?, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099, 2105 (1989).
376. Id. at 2099.
377. Id.
378. 792 P.2d 1049 (Kan. 1990).
379. Id. at 1050.
380. Id. at 1051.
381. Id.
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informed him that he was wanted for the triple murder of the Fager
family.382 Butterworth voluntarily surrendered to the police and was
charged with killing the Fagers.383
Because he had no memory of the crimes with which he was
charged, Butterworth was hypnotized on ten occasions over a four
month period by a licensed psychologist for both forensic and thera-
peutic reasons.3  Under hypnosis, Butterworth made a shocking rev-
elation which he later shared with a jury of his peers at trial.385
Exercising his constitutional right to testify, Butterworth told the fol-
lowing story:
On the afternoon of the murders, Butterworth had returned to the
solarium after his lunch break.38 6 He remembered starting to work
when he noticed the smell of chlorine and condensation on the glass in
the solarium. 3s He concluded that someone was in the spa.38 Figur-
ing it to be Kelli Fager and her boyfriend,38 9 Butterworth decided to
leave until they were finished using the spa so he could work without
disturbing them.390 In the meantime, Butterworth decided to go to
the shopping mall to see if there were any after-Christmas sales.
It was getting dark when Butterworth left the mall and returned to
the Fager home.391 What he found upon his arrival made his blood
run cold.392
He cried as he recalled opening the solarium door and seeing Sherri
Fager face up in the spa. He started to pull her out and realized she
was dead. He went into the house and saw Mr. Fager lying dead on
the floor. He knelt beside him, saw some keys beside him, and
picked them up .... He... started to get up when he thought he
heard something... like somebody trying to cry or scream ... he
thought it might be the Fagers' dog ... he started toward the base-
ment stairs where he thought the sound came from .... It wasn't
the dog.393
At this point, Butterworth testified that he became frightened and ran
away. Because he believed that the "sound" he had heard was
made by Kelli, who Butterworth imagined was still alive, and who he
382. Id
383. lId
384. Id Butterworth claimed that he remembered preparing for work on the
morning of December 30 and that his next recollection was of listening to a news
broadcast on the radio about the Fager murders, after which he called his wife. Id.
385. l at 1051-53.
386. Id at 1052.
387. Id.
388. Id
389. Id
390. Id
391. Id
392. Id at 1052-53.
393. Id
394. Id at 1052.
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believed he could have saved, he fled to Florida ashamed and unable
to face his own family.395 Butterworth then added that "if he had not
been cowardly, Keri might not have been killed ''3 96 and that "he
feared he might abandon his own children in such a situation. '
3 7
Intriguingly, Butterworth's insight into his psyche was gained only
after his therapist had told him that, in his expert opinion, "he be-
lieved Butterworth to be innocent but suffering from guilt and self-
condemnation. '398 Nine days after the doctor shared this opinion
with Butterworth-after four months of therapy in which he was hyp-
notized nine times and revealed no such complex39P-Butterworth
made the "shocking" revelation that he was not a killer, but a coward,
and accordingly, his memory loss was triggered by the accompanying
emotions of "guilt and self-condemnation."' 0°
After hearing Butterworth's testimony, the jury acquitted him of all
charges.4 °1 Subsequently, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the ac-
quittal.4°2 In defending the trial court's decision to admit But-
terworth's hypnotically refreshed testimony, the Kansas Supreme
Court adopted the Hurd safeguards 4°3 to be applied when determin-
ing the admissibility of a criminal defendant's hypnotically refreshed
testimony. In addition, the court adopted an additional safeguard
that the hypnosis should be conducted in a neutral setting if possi-
ble.405 Moreover, the court ruled that it is the defendant's burden to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that substantial safe-
guards were utilized.4 6
2. State v. L.K.:40 7 "I'm No 'Angel,' So Acquit Me"
In State v. L.K, L.K., a nineteen year old college student,44 S was
accused of murdering her father and aunt.4°9 One evening in October
1988, L.K. met with her cousin, a former high school football star,
395. Id. at 1053.
396. Id. at 1052.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 1052-53.
400. Id. at 1052.
401. Id. at 1055.
402. Id. at 1059. The State was able to appeal the judgment because it reserved the
question of the propriety of the admission of Butterworth's testimony. Id. at 1050.
403. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
404. Butterworth, 792 P.2d at 1057-58.
405. Id. at 1058. The office of the expert who will conduct the hypnosis is an exam-
pie of a neutral setting. Id.
406. Id. at 1059.
407. 582 A.2d 297 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
408. See Joyce A. Venezia, Student Draws 30-Year Term for Plotting to Kill Father,
Aunt Judge Rejects Defendant's Attempt to Withdraw Earlier Admission of Guilt, Star
Ledger, May 5, 1991, at 13.
409. Id.
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Patrick,41 0 in her home in the wealthy residential community of Upper
Saddle River, New Jersey.41' L.K. confided in Patrick and told him
that her father, a banker, had embezzled millions of dollars and
stashed the money in foreign banks.41 2 Motivated by the promise of a
substantial inheritance, L.K. and Patrick conspired to kill her
family.413
The next morning, L.K. poisoned her father's coffee.41 4 He did not
drink it, however, because it tasted bitter.415 Frustrated that the mur-
der attempt failed, L.K. left the family's home and went to the library
leaving Patrick to finish the deed.41 6 Patrick then bludgeoned to
death L.K.'s father and aunt417 with a two-foot long,41 8 fifteen pound
metal pipe.41 9 L.K.'s younger brother was also beaten but survived
the attack.420
L.K.'s plan to "live like a queen and travel the world"' 42' was
quashed, however, when she was charged with the murders of her fa-
ther and aunt.422 Under the direction of her lawyers, L.K. was ex-
amined by a psychiatrist. Under hypnosis, L.K. told the following
story:
She was five years old when her father began to beat and sexually
abuse her.423 As a defensive measure, L.K. created alter personalities
to cope with the abuse.424 L.K. had two other personalities, Ange-
lique and Angel.4 1 Angelique was the "nurturer," an excessively
good-natured personality. 26 In contrast, Angelique's alter ego, An-
gel, was the "protector,"427 a vengeful personality that encouraged
Patrick to kill L.K.'s father and aunt.42  L.K., the host personality,
410. Tom Hester, Defense to Cite Multiple Personalities in a "First" for a Jersey
Murder Trial: Bergen Woman Will Claim Insanity in Killing of Wealthy Father, Aunt,
Star-Ledger, Oct. 30, 1990, at 19.
411. Bill Sanderson, Psychiatrist Sees Three Faces of Laura Kaldawy's Multiple Per-
sonalities, The Record, Feb. 27, 1990, at Al [hereinafter Sanderson, Three Faces of
Laura K.].
412. Id. at A12.
413. Hester, supra note 410, at 19.
414. Sanderson, Three Faces of Laura K., supra note 411, at A12.
415. I.
416. Id.
417. Venezia, supra note 408, at 13.
418. Hester, supra note 410, at 19.
419. Sanderson, Three Faces of Laura K, supra note 411, at A12.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. I.
423. State v. L.K., 582 A.2d 297, 300 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); Sanderson,
Three Faces of Laura K, supra note 411, at Al.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id. at Al, A12.
427. Id. at Al.
428. State v. L.K., 582 A.2d 297, 301 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
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was oblivious to Angel's plan to kill her father.429 Angel explained
that L.K. had never agreed to kill her father because L.K. loved him
and he was all she had left.430 Nevertheless, Angel made the decision
to murder him.43'
Because the State anticipated that L.K. would use an insanity de-
fense based on Multiple Personality Disorder,43 the prosecutor filed
an interlocutory appeal asking the court to decide in advance how the
Hurd procedural safeguards must be applied to a criminal defendant's
hypnotically refreshed testimony.433 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that the Hurd guidelines apply to both the criminal de-
fendant and the State.43 Furthermore, the court held that an addi-
tional safeguard must be utilized when the hypnotically refreshed
testimony of the accused is at issue: that the trial judge "conduct an in
camera review of the prehearing evidence required by Hurd before
the same is delivered to the prosecutor.., and redact the prehearing
evidence if it exceeds the scope contemplated by Hurd.14 35 The court
explained that the purpose of this additional safeguard is to prevent
the need to establish reliability from clashing with any legitimate
rights of the accused.436
Just before L.K. was to be examined by the State's psychiatrist to
determine if she indeed suffered from Multiple Personality Disorder,
L.K. agreed to plead guilty for attempting to murder her father and
aunt. At her sentencing hearing, L.K.'s lawyer explained to the court
429. Bill Sanderson, Insanity Plea Due in Double Murder: Girl to Claim Multiple
Personality, The Record, Feb. 28, 1990, at B1 [hereinafter Sanderson, Insanity Plea].
430. Id,
431. Id&
432. Multiple Personality Disorder as a basis of the insanity defense has been sar-
donically referred to as "The Devil Made Me Do It" defense. See United States v.
Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999,1022 (10th Cir. 1993) (Logan, J., concurring). Ironically, in
this case, the defendant claims that an alter-ego named "Angel" made her do it. Such
a defense has been accepted in a minority of jurisdictions where individuals suffering
from Multiple Personality Disorder are found insane as a matter of law. See Jacque-
line R. Kanovitz et al., Witnesses With Multiple Personality Disorder, 23 Pepp. L Rev.
387, 408 n.73 (1996) (quoting Professor Saks who "contends that the host personality
and the perpetrator are, in a philosophical sense, different people and consequently,
that the host should not be sent to prison for 'some[one] else's' crimes" (citations
omitted)). But see id. at 408 (citing cases adhering to the majority approach that
"place[s] the focus on the perpetrating identity's mental state.. . [and finding that the]
multiple is deemed to be legally sane if the state in control at the time of the act
appreciates the criminality of the conduct"). At least one group of police investiga-
tors, however, has opted to eschew philosophical theories of Multiple Personality Dis-
order, and apply a practical approach instead when faced with a criminal defendant
claiming to be so afflicted. State v. Blackman, 875 S.W.2d 122, 130 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994) (urging a criminal defendant who was accused of killing a police officer and who
claimed to be afflicted with MPD to "have his 'good side' tell what his 'bad side' had
done").
433. L.K., 582 A.2d 297, 298 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
434. Id. at 302.
435. Id. at 305.
436. Id.
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that his client, a "sad, unhappy, confused and emotionally unstable
child," '437 deserved a lenient sentence because she "had a change of
heart" on the morning of the murders and warned her father not to
drink the coffee that she had poisoned.438 Unmoved by her lawyer's
pleadings, the judge sentenced L.K. to two consecutive fifteen year
prison terms.439 The court subsequently refused to allow L.K. to with-
draw her guilty pleas.44°
3. Applying the Proposed Admissibility Test to Butterworth
and L.K.
Because the admissibility analysis proposed in this Note is a rights-
oriented test, results under this test may seem unpalatable in some
situations. For example, the testimony offered by the defendant in
Butterworth satisfied all three prongs of the analysis. The testimony
Butterworth offered was "in his own words," and therefore the first
prong of the test, which is geared towards protecting the accused's
autonomy interest, was satisfied. Butterworth personally offered the
testimony at trial, thereby satisfying the second prong of the analysis
which is designed to ensure a minimum level of reliability by subject-
ing the accused to the elements of confrontation: Butterworth swore
to tell the "truth," he was cross-examined by the prosecutor, and the
jury was able to observe his demeanor while he testified. Finally, the
State was not able to successfully argue that its interest in barring But-
terworth's testimony outweighed Butterworth's constitutional right to
testify in his defense, and accordingly, the third prong of the admissi-
bility analysis was satisfied. The occasional unpalatable result must be
tolerated, however, in the effort to protect individual rights.
Nevertheless, a rights-oriented analysis like the test proposed in this
Note may render palatable results while simultaneously protecting in-
dividual rights. L.K provides an example. In this case, the court held
that the Hurd guidelines applied to the testimony of the defendant.
Adherence to the safeguards would cause the defendant's contacts
with her hypnotist and any information she related during hypnosis to
be a matter of record. As a result, every detail of L.K.'s hypnotically
elicited "story" would be available for scrutiny by the prosecutor who
could then confront L.K. with inconsistencies in her story during
cross-examination. In order to satisfy the second prong of the admis-
sibility analysis, L.K. would have to face cross-examination. Instead
of adhering to the safeguards set out by the court in order to preserve
her right to tell her "story," L.K. pleaded guilty and was subsequently
sentenced to a thirty-year prison term.
437. Venezia, supra note 408, at 13.
438. Id
439. Il
440. Ia
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CONCLUSION
Because the criminal defendant has the right to testify on her own
behalf, her interest in testifying differs from that of any other witness.
Therefore, two standards are necessary to determine the admissibility
of hypnotically refreshed testimony. Hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony of witnesses other than the accused should be per se inadmissi-
ble as a matter of policy because such testimony is inherently
unreliable. Nonetheless, a criminal defendant's hypnotically refreshed
testimony should be admissible on a case-by-case basis employing the
rights-oriented analysis proposed by this Note which balances the ac-
cused's autonomy interest in telling her "story" against the State's in-
terest in barring unreliable testimony.
By securing the right of the accused to testify on her own behalf, we
further not only the individual criminal defendant's interests, but
those of society as a whole. For at the heart of our justice system is
the fundamental precept that all individuals should be recognized,
heard, and respected by the law."' Thus, out of respect for the inher-
ent dignity of the individual, a criminal defendant-even the criminal
defendant accused of the most heinous crime-should be granted the
opportunity to approach the witness stand and tell her own unique
"story" to the court that will determine her fate."'
441. The admissibility analysis proposed by this Note is related to a movement in
legal scholarship that is characterized as "a call to context." Massaro, supra note 375,
at 2099. This approach beckons courts to allow compassion and substantive justice
affect their decision-making process when analyzing the legal issues that individual
litigants bring before the court. Id. at 2100. Legal decision-makers are urged to ac-
knowledge the "unique life story that each litigant represents." Id One way to fur-
ther this goal is to allow individuals who are before the court to tell their "stories"
because "[t]elling stories can move us to care, and hence pave the way to action." Id.
at 2105.
442. In his impassioned dissent in Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1978),
Judge Godbold proclaimed:
Indeed, our history is replete with trials of defendants who faced the court,
determined to speak before their fate was pronounced: Socrates, who con-
demned Athenian justice heedless of the cup of hemlock; Charles I, who
challenged the jurisdiction of the Cromwellians over a divine monarch; Su-
san B. Anthony, who argued for the female ballot; and Sacco and Vanzetti,
who revealed the flaws of the tribunal
Id. at 1078. Godbold's dissent was specially filed in response to the majority's opinion
which can be found in 549 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1977).
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